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Telemedicine Scams
Katrice Bridges Copeland *
ABSTRACT: Telemedicine emerged as a lifeline during the COVID-19
pandemic. Although the technology existed long before the pandemic, its use
was limited due to strict government regulations that limited reimbursement for
telemedicine visits. In response to the pandemic, the Government waived
many of its restrictions for the duration of the Public Health Emergency.
These changes fueled the growth of telemedicine.
The problem, however, is that telemedicine makes it easier to conduct fraud
on a large scale because without in-person visits, medical providers can reach
many more beneficiaries in a short period of time. Thus, the size and scale of
typical health care fraud schemes, such as sending medically unnecessary
durable medical equipment, is magnified. This type of fraud has been on the
rise since 2016, and, with the relaxed rules for telemedicine reimbursement
during the pandemic, there is a serious concern that there will be a sharp
increase in telemedicine fraud.
This Article examines the fraudulent practices in the telemedicine industry and
the conditions that permit them to flourish. This Article critically assesses
the changes to telemedicine coverage and their relationship to fraud. It
examines the fraudulent practices through the lens of the fraud triangle
to determine why telemedicine fraud occurs. After assessing the causes of
telemedicine fraud, this Article argues that there is no need for additional
criminal statutes to address telemedicine fraud. As the typical telemedicine
scam involves the payment of kickbacks and billing for medically unnecessary
treatment and services, the existing fraud laws such as the Anti-Kickback
statute and the False Claims Act are sufficiently capacious to address the
criminality involved in these cases. This Article also argues that in lieu of
additional criminal statutes, the Government should focus on additional
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measures to prevent or detect telemedicine fraud because preventative measures
are the best way to safeguard the integrity of federal health care programs.
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INTRODUCTION
Telemedicine, which is remote patient care using electronic
communication, emerged as a lifeline during the COVID-19 pandemic. 1

1. See Telehealth and Telemedicine, AM. ACAD. OF FAM. PHYSICIANS (Dec. 2021), https://www
.aafp.org/about/policies/all/telehealth-telemedicine.html [https://perma.cc/6659-HCLQ];
HEALTHCARE FRAUD PREVENTION P’SHIP, WHITE PAPER: FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE IN THE
CONTEXT OF COVID-19, at 14–16 (2022), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/hfpp-whitepaper-healthcare-fraud-waste-and-abuse-context-covid-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9RB-VZ8].
This Article will use the term “telemedicine” when discussing patient video or telephone visits
but will not change quotations that use the term “telehealth” in lieu of telemedicine when
describing these visits.
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Although the technology existed long before the COVID-19 pandemic, its
use was limited due to strict government regulations. In response to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) made significant changes to its regulations regarding the use and
reimbursement of telemedicine services for the duration of the declared
Public Health Emergency. 2 These changes, along with the imposition of stayat-home orders and the sharp rise in COVID-19 hospitalizations during
2020, fueled the growth of telemedicine. 3 In turn, telemedicine reduced
the burden on the health care system and allowed patients to receive care
safely in their own homes while under stay-at-home orders or practicing
social distancing. 4
The changes to telemedicine coverage have ushered in both a great
expansion of health care access and immense new possibilities for fraud
through the exploitation of the Public Health Emergency regulation changes.
There have long been concerns about a dearth of health care providers in
rural, economically disadvantaged, and underserved areas. 5 Telemedicine
has often been touted as one way to increase access to health care in
underserved communities. 6 Prior to the expansion of telemedicine during the
pandemic, Medicare coverage for telemedicine services was only permitted if:
(1) the beneficiary was located in a rural or health professional shortage area;
(2) services were delivered in an interactive audio and video telecommunication
system; and (3) the beneficiary was in a practitioner’s office or a specified
medical facility during the telemedicine visit. 7 The waiver of these requirements
permitted people in underserved and urban areas to access care through
telemedicine, allowed beneficiaries to have telemedicine visits in their own
homes, and allowed audio only telemedicine visits (alleviating some concerns
about disparate access to broadband and electronic devices). Thus, the number
of telemedicine visits skyrocketed during the first year of the pandemic.
At the same time, however, telemedicine makes it easier to conduct fraud
on a large scale. Medical providers are able to reach many beneficiaries in a

2. See HEALTHCARE FRAUD PREVENTION P’SHIP, supra note 1, at 12–17.
3. See id. Telemedicine visits for primary care “increased from 4.1% in Q1 2020 to 35.3%
in Q2 2020.” Id. at 18. In addition, “[i]nitial data from Medicaid and CHIP beneficiaries captured
from March through June 2020 indicated that 2,632% more services were delivered via telehealth
than during the same period in 2019.” Id.
4. See infra Section I.B.2.
5. See MEGAN LAHR, CARRIE HENNING-SMITH, ADRITA RAHMAN & ASHLEY M. HERNANDEZ,
UNIV. MINN. RURAL HEALTH RSCH. CTR., BARRIERS TO HEALTH CARE ACCESS FOR RURAL MEDICARE
BENEFICIARIES: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM RURAL HEALTH CLINICS 1 (2021), https://3pea7g1qp8
f3t9ooe3z3npx1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/UMN-RHC-Access-t
o-Care-PB_1.20_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UMW-FCFS].
6. Taylan Bozkurt, Jose F. Flórez-Arango & Matt Levi, Telemedicine, in CDC YELLOW BOOK
ch. 2(15) (2020), https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/yellowbook/2020/preparing-international-trav
elers/telemedicine [https://perma.cc/XZ74-KVMS]; see infra Section I.A.
7. See infra Section I.B.1.
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short period of time, and they do not need an in-person visit to order expensive
and unnecessary laboratory tests, prescriptions, or durable medical
equipment (“DME”). 8 HHS and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have been
combatting a rise in large-scale telemedicine fraud since 2016. 9
In September 2020, the DOJ announced the largest health care fraud
takedown in history, “Operation Rubber Stamp,” which had a total of 345
defendants and resulted in more than $6 billion in alleged fraud losses. 10
More than two-thirds of the losses, $4.5 billion, were related to telemedicine.11
Although the schemes vary, the masterminds behind the schemes are typically
telemedicine executives who hire marketing firms to target Medicare
patients and collect their information. 12 The telemedicine executives then
provide the information to doctors and nurse practitioners and pay them
to order unnecessary DME (such as orthotics or braces), genetic and other
diagnostic testing, and pain medications. 13 The doctors and nurse practitioners
then contact the patients with whom they have no prior relationship and have
brief telemedicine visits or no visit at all before writing the orders. 14 The DME
companies, genetic testing laboratories, and pharmacies then purchase those
orders in exchange for illegal kickbacks and bribes and submit false and
fraudulent claims for reimbursement to Medicare and other government
insurers. 15
The DOJ’s historic 2020 takedown exposed fraud that occurred prior to
the COVID-19 pandemic and the resultant surge in the demand for

8. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT
POLICY 471 (2021) [hereinafter 2021 REPORT TO CONGRESS], https://www.medpac.gov/wp-cont
ent/uploads/import_data/scrape_files/docs/defaultsource/reports/mar21_medpac_report_to_t
he_congress_sec.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQJ3-Y9F7]. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (Public Law
No. 105–33) established the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission as an independent
congressional agency charged with advising Congress on issues affecting the Medicare
program. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission provides two reports to Congress each
year. Id. at foreword.
9. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 2020 NATIONAL HEALTH
CARE FRAUD TAKEDOWN (2020), https://oig.hhs.gov/documents/root/230/2020HealthCare
Takedown_FactSheet_9dtIhW4.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TBK-F6LJ].
10. Id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Operation Rubber Stamp: Major Health Care
Fraud Investigation Results in Significant New Charges (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.justice.gov
/usao-sdga/pr/operation-rubber-stamp-major-health-care-fraud-investigation-results-significant
-new [https://perma.cc/273Z-8CA9]; see U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., HEALTH CARE F RAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR F ISCAL YEAR
2020, at 34 (2020) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT], https://oig.hhs.gov/publicat
ions/docs/hcfac/FY2020-hcfac.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AHP-5JDS].
11. HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT, supra note 10, at 9–10.
12. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NATIONAL TELEFRAUD
TAKEDOWN: THE ALLEGED SCHEME AND KEY PLAYERS (2020), https://oig.hhs.gov/documents/ro
ot/232/telemed-scheme-print_CkIjtht.pdf [https://perma.cc/2825-V2T8].
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
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telemedicine. The concern is that increased utilization of telemedicine
services will further expose federal health care programs to fraudulent
schemes. As HHS Deputy Inspector General Gary Cantrell explained,
“[t]elemedicine can foster efficient, high-quality care when practiced
appropriately and lawfully.[] Unfortunately, bad actors attempt to abuse
telemedicine services and leverage aggressive marketing techniques to
mislead beneficiaries about their health care needs and bill the Government
for illegitimate services.” 16 Indeed, there has been at least one major case
involving telemedicine fraud since the beginning of the pandemic. 17 The
HHS Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) is so concerned with the risk of
telemedicine fraud that it has taken the extraordinary step of issuing a “Special
Fraud Alert” warning practitioners about suspicious agreements with
telemedicine companies. 18
The primary victims of telemedicine scams are Medicare and other
federal health care programs that “ha[ve] footed the bill for billions worth
of” unnecessary genetic tests, DME, and prescriptions. 19 The telemedicine
scams further tax government health care programs that are already
struggling financially. Patients are also substantially harmed through these
scams. In some cases, the harm is financial, in that “patients [have] had to pay
for declined services.” 20 In other situations, patients either never received
the DME, test results, or medications, or they turned out to be useless “to the
patients and their actual primary care doctors.” 21 Further, “the misdirection,
fake diagnoses, and unneeded tests misled patients and delayed their chance
to seek appropriate treatment for medical complaints.” 22 With respect to
genetic testing in particular, the Government may deny a future claim for a
16. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., National Health Care Fraud and Opioid Takedown
Results in Charges Against 345 Defendants Responsible for More than $6 Billion in Alleged
Fraud Losses (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/national-health-care-fraud-andopioid-takedown-results-charges-against-345-defendants [https://perma.cc/36L4-FTRY].
17. See infra Section III.A.
18. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SPECIAL FRAUD ALERT:
OIG ALERTS PRACTITIONERS TO EXERCISE CAUTION WHEN ENTERING INTO ARRANGEMENTS WITH
PURPORTED TELEMEDICINE COMPANIES 1 (2022) [hereinafter SPECIAL FRAUD ALERT], https://oig
.hhs.gov/documents/root/1045/sfa-telefraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3PR-Q9WN].
19. Annalisa Merelli, Telehealth Fraud Has Cheated the US of Billions in the Pandemic, QUARTZ
(July 20, 2022), https://qz.com/2014700/telehealth-frauds-cost-the-us-more-than-6-billion [https:
//perma.cc/Z5TN-DNKX].
20. Id.
21. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 9. Unnecessary genetic tests in particular will have
very little value for the patient. “The results from these tests only provide information about risks
for developing a particular disease, and individuals can take only minimal action on the
information, particularly when the results are presented to patients without proper interpretation
or guidance by their treating physician or a healthcare provider.” HEALTHCARE FRAUD
PREVENTION P’SHIP, WHITE PAPER: GENETIC TESTING FRAUD, WASTE, & ABUSE 13–14 (2020),
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/hfpp-genetic-testing-fwa-white-paper.pdf [https://perma
.cc/FFR6-SZ4C].
22. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 9 (emphasis omitted).
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necessary genetic test due to reimbursement for the previous unnecessary
test. 23 In addition to the patients directly affected by the fraud, taxpayers
end up facing “rising . . . health care premiums and out-of-pocket costs.” 24
This is the first Article to address fraud in the telemedicine industry.
Once the Public Health Emergency is over, it will be impossible to put
telemedicine back into a box and shut the lid. Telemedicine is here to stay.
It is not clear which, if any, of the previous restrictions on access to
telemedicine the Government will reimpose. The Government’s interest
in investigating and prosecuting telemedicine fraud will likely increase, as
will the need to impose new measures to prevent telemedicine fraud. In
formulating new rules aimed at telemedicine fraud, the key question is how
to balance access to care with fraud prevention.
This Article examines telemedicine schemes that take advantage of the
vulnerabilities in federal health care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.
Part I provides background on telemedicine and the Government’s pre- and
post-pandemic coverage of telemedicine services. It also examines the
relationship between telemedicine coverage restrictions and fraud. Part II
provides an overview of the statutes used to prosecute telemedicine schemes.
It also discusses the Government’s fraud detection methods. Part III assesses the
state of fraud in the telemedicine industry. It begins by scrutinizing the
schemes that telemedicine executives utilize to defraud patients and
insurers. It then examines telemedicine fraud through the lens of the
fraud triangle to assess why telemedicine fraud occurs.
Part IV argues that there is no need for additional criminal statutes to
address telemedicine fraud. As the typical telemedicine scam involves the
payment of kickbacks and billing for medically unnecessary treatment and
services, the existing fraud laws such as the Anti-Kickback statute and the False
Claims Act are sufficiently capacious to address the criminality involved in these
23. HEALTHCARE FRAUD PREVENTION P’SHIP, supra note 21, at 13. The Healthcare Fraud
Prevention Partnership explained that if a patient was caught up in one of these schemes and
had genetic tests it could lead to serious problems in the future:
If that individual were to have hereditary cancer testing ordered by a treating provider
in the future, the claim might be denied as most hereditary genetic testing is only
allowed once-in-a-lifetime. At a critical time where the test is needed in earnest, the
record may show such an analysis was already performed and is no longer an
available benefit for that individual.
Id.
24. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Federal Indictments & Law Enforcement Actions in
One of the Largest Health Care Fraud Schemes Involving Telemedicine and Durable Medical
Equipment Marketing Executives Results in Charges Against 24 Individuals Responsible for Over
$1.2 Billion in Losses (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-indictments-andlaw-enforcement-actions-one-largest-health-care-fraud-schemes [https://perma.cc/4MXE-L82X]; see
also Anthony Kyriakakis, The Missing Victims of Health Care Fraud, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 605, 619
(“[M]ost of the direct economic harms third-party payers and insurers suffer are eventually
passed along to taxpayers, employers, and beneficiaries in the form of higher tax burdens, more
expensive premiums, and less comprehensive coverage.”).
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cases. It also argues that in lieu of additional criminal statutes, the
Government should focus on additional measures to prevent or detect
telemedicine fraud because preventative measures are the best way to assure
program integrity. Further, Part IV examines three potential fraud prevention
and detection measures. First, it assesses the viability of a rule requiring a
pre-existing doctor-patient relationship that was established in person
prior to reimbursement for durable medical equipment and expensive genetic
tests. Second, it examines the impact that a rule limiting reimbursement for
telemedicine visits based on the provider’s payment model would have on
fraud prevention. Third, it explores the potential for changes to Medicare
enrollment and claim reimbursement to identify and prevent fraud before
it occurs. Lastly, Part IV also assesses each proposal through the lens of the
fraud triangle and the underlying need to balance the conflicting goals of
telemedicine (access to care) with fraud enforcement (cost containment). This
Article concludes that changes to Medicare enrollment and claims
reimbursement will be the most effective way to prevent fraud and preserve
access to care.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. TELEHEALTH AND TELEMEDICINE
Although “[t]here is no single definition for telehealth,” telehealth is
generally understood to be “a collection of means [or methods] to enhance
[health] care and education delivery” using telecommunications technologies. 25
Telemedicine refers specifically to “the practice of medicine using
[communication] technology to deliver care” remotely. 26 Thus, the focus
is on the provision of clinical services (examination, diagnosis, and
treatment) from a distance. The term telehealth has often been used
interchangeably with telemedicine, but telehealth is broader than telemedicine
because it encompasses “a broader scope of remote . . . services.” 27 For example,
a live video visit between a doctor and patient is telemedicine whereas a
patient’s use of an online patient portal to view her medical records is
telehealth.

25. What is Telehealth?, CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, https://www.cchpca.org/whatis-telehealth [https://perma.cc/SLT4-EB7W].
26. Telehealth and Telemedicine, supra note 1.
27. Id. (“[T]elehealth can refer to remote non-clinical services such as provider training,
continuing medical education or public health education, administrative meetings, and electronic
information sharing to facilitate and support assessment, diagnosis, consultation, treatment,
education, and care management.”); see also PHILIPPE BARDY, T HE HUMAN CHALLENGE OF
TELEMEDICINE 4 (2019) (explaining that telehealth applications include “all sites and portals, in
whole or in part related to health, that can be found on the internet. These sites, well known
to patients and practitioners, offer numerous services: advice, recommendations, articles, forums,
newsletters and, for some of them, online medical records”).
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Telemedicine companies, that are at the center of the fraud schemes
discussed in this Article, provide telemedicine services by hiring health care
providers and furnishing the remote communications technology for
those providers. The telemedicine companies pay health care providers to
conduct consultations with patients. Telemedicine companies then bill
private or public insurance companies or offer a membership program to
their customers to generate revenue.
There are several different approaches used in the provision of
telemedicine services. In real-time or synchronous visits, the information
and data are transferred live. 28 Typically, this type of visit occurs through the
use of video conferencing between the patient and health care provider,
but it may also include activities such as the live viewing of ultrasounds as they
take place or the streaming of medical procedures from the operating room. 29
In “store-and-forward” or asynchronous approaches, prerecorded medical
information, such as patient intake forms or X-rays, is transmitted to a health
care provider “to diagnose or treat [an] issue.” 30 It is commonly “used for
patient intake or follow-up care.” 31 Telemonitoring, or remote patient
monitoring, is the use of personal health technologies to record, process, and
transmit information from the patient to the doctor. 32 Remote monitoring
could include at-home devices, such as heart rate or blood pressure monitors
and can be used for chronic disease management. 33
Telemedicine is uniquely situated to address some of the most pressing
problems in health care. In particular, it can help address problems such
as inequalities in “accessibility, cost, [and] the shortage of trained physicians.” 34
One of the biggest benefits of telemedicine is the cost and time savings.
Patients need not travel to the doctor, which reduces both travel costs and
waiting time. 35 In addition, it makes it easier to visit with specialists who may not
be located in the patient’s community. 36 Telemedicine is particularly useful

28. U.S. DEP ’ T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., T ELEHEALTH FOR DIRECT- TO -CONSUMER CARE
(2021), https://telehealth.hhs.gov/providers/direct-to-consumer/synchronous-direct-to-con
sumer-telehealth [https://perma.cc/Z7KM-5ZLR].
29. See id.
30. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ASYNCHRONOUS DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER TELEHEALTH
(2021), https://telehealth.hhs.gov/providers/direct-to-consumer/asynchronous-direct-to-cons
umer-telehealth [https://perma.cc/FNV5-MWDC].
31. Id.
32. See Telehealth: Defining 21st Century Care, AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, https://www.america
ntelemed.org/resource/why-telemedicine [https://perma.cc/NVG5-GQBK].
33. Id.
34. Mohit Joshi, Telehealth Has Huge Potential, but Challenges Remain, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2020,
8:20 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusinessdevelopmentcouncil/2020/02/12/tele
health-has-huge-potential-but-challenges-remain/?sh=2a4714b6191a [https://perma.cc/MXG8
-BQ3W].
35. Bozkurt et al., supra note 6, ch. 2(15).
36. Id.

2. COPELAND_PP_PR1_KC2 (002)_2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

TELEMEDICINE SCAMS

11/1/2022 11:37 PM

77

in rural areas 37 and underserved communities. 38 A major stumbling block
for telemedicine access in rural and underserved areas, however, is the
lack of reliable and affordable broadband connectivity. 39 Without reliable
broadband connectivity, the electronic transmission of data that is necessary
for live video visits is not possible. And even when broadband is available in
rural or underserved communities, “its cost can be three times” the cost “in
urban areas.” 40
Another impediment to the widespread use of telemedicine is state
physician licensing laws. Forty-eight “states and the District of Columbia
require that physicians” treating patients through the use of telemedicine
must “be licensed in the state [where] the patient” resides. 41 Thus, a specialist
licensed to practice in Maryland could not have a telemedicine visit with a
patient in rural West Virginia unless the specialist is also licensed in West
Virginia. One way to address this issue is through multistate compacts that
allow providers in participating states to have an expedited procedure for
multi-state licensing. As of March 2018, twenty-two states have enacted a
physician multistate compact called the Interstate Medical Licensure
Compact. 42 The multistate compacts serve the dual purposes of increasing
access to care and assisting the use of telemedicine. 43
The other major barrier to widespread use of telemedicine is the
uncertainty concerning cost and reimbursement. Historically, the Government’s
policies and regulations concerning telemedicine have been difficult to
navigate. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next Part, Medicare

37. “Telemedicine has benefits in both rural and urban areas, but it is not always a viable
option. In remote rural areas, there may not be the bandwidth and connectivity capable of
supporting the communication technologies.” Id.
38. See Telehealth vs. Telemedicine, AMD GLOB. TELEMEDICINE (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www
.amdtelemedicine.com/blog/article/telehealth-vs-telemedicine-how-telehealth-different-teleme
dicine [https://perma.cc/C6TQ-CWBX].
39. Gary Shapiro, Broadband Access: Health Care’s Newest Challenge, STAT (Nov. 12, 2021),
https://www.statnews.com/2021/11/12/broadband-access-newest-challenge-health-care [https:
//perma.cc/F6YL-KH3U].
40. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MEDICAID AND
CHIP: MARCH 2018, at 46 (2018) [hereinafter MARCH 2018 MACPAC REPORT], https://www.ma
cpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Report-to-Congress-on-Medicaid-and-CHIP-March2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HBK7-Y9ME] (“Although the Federal Communications Commission
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture have programs to facilitate expansion of broadband to
rural areas, the required application, cost sharing, and process for obtaining funds may
prevent health care providers from accessing them. In addition, there are likely to be costs
associated with the acquisition, installation, maintenance, repair, and replacement of front-end
technology needed to establish telehealth as a way of delivering services. However, not all states
provide payment for these costs, which may be prohibitive and thus affect providers’ ability
or willingness to adopt telehealth.” (citation omitted)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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provided very limited support for telemedicine. 44 Medicare’s reimbursement
for telemedicine visits was based on very strict geographic limitations, and
Medicare would not reimburse telemedicine visits that took place in a
patient’s home. 45 In addition, the reimbursement rate for telemedicine visits
was typically lower than an in-person visit. 46 The Public Health Emergency
brought on by COVID-19 acted as a catalyst in the adoption of telemedicine
and required regulatory flexibilities concerning reimbursement.
B. MEDICARE AND MEDICAID COVERAGE FOR TELEMEDICINE SERVICES
Medicare is a national, federally funded insurance program that provides
free or below-cost health care benefits for individuals who are age sixty-five or
older or those with long-term disabilities. 47 Medicare includes payments
for telemedicine visits under Medicare Part B which covers outpatient
care. 48 In 2019, Medicare provided benefits to nearly sixty-one million
beneficiaries at a cost of around $782 billion. 49 Medicaid is a joint federal‐
state program that supports states’ coverage of medical care and other
support services for certain categories of low‐income individuals. 50 The
Federal Government pays a share, known as the Federal Medical Assistance

44. See infra Section I.B.1.
45. See infra Section I.B.1.
46. See infra Section I.B.1.
47. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395hhh (2018) (providing the standard for Medicare); CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & M EDICAID S ERVS., M EDICARE PROGRAM - GENERAL I NFORMATION (2021)
[hereinafter CMS MEDICARE GENERAL INFORMATION], http://www.cms.gov/MedicareGenInfo
[https://perma.cc/C4VR-CSLH] (noting that Medicare provides coverage to those aged sixtyfive and older, individuals with certain disabilities, and individuals with end-stage renal disease).
Medicare has four parts: Part A (inpatient hospital care), Part B (outpatient care), Part C
(Parts A and B delivered through a managed care plan), and Part D (prescription drug coverage).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395hhh. Private insurance companies sell Part C plans. See U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., WHAT IS MEDICARE PART C? (2021), https://www.hhs.gov/answers/medi
care-and-medicaid/what-is-medicare-part-c/index.html [https://perma.cc/QXD9-46PV]. Part C
includes the same coverage as original Medicare but may also include additional benefits. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(m) (describing special payment rules for particular items and services
under Part B). Medicare Part B covers medical services provided by physicians, medical clinics,
laboratories, and other qualified health care providers, such as office visits, laboratory testing,
and minor surgical procedures. CMS MEDICARE GENERAL I NFORMATION, supra note 47.
Medicare also covers telemedicine visits through Part C, but the focus of this article is on
coverage under Medicare Part B. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(m).
49. ALISON MITCHELL ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43357, MEDICAID: AN OVERVIEW 1
(2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R43357.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AKU-PZ44].
50. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DUALLY ELIGIBLE INDIVIDUALS - CATEGORIES
(2022), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare-Medicaid-Coordination/Medicare-and-Medicaid-Coor
dination/Medicare-Medicaid-Coordination-Office/Downloads/MedicareMedicaidEnrollee
Categories.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UEX-PCDD]. “Medicaid was designed to provide coverage to
groups with a wide range of health care needs that historically were excluded from the private
health insurance market (e.g., individuals with disabilities who require [long-term services
and supports] or indigent populations in geographic locations where access to providers is
limited).” MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 49, at 3.
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Percentage, 51 of each state’s Medicaid costs. 52 Medicaid’s coverage of
telemedicine visits varies from state to state. In 2019, Medicaid had
approximately seventy-five million enrollees at a cost of $627 billion. 53
1. Pre-Pandemic Coverage of Telemedicine Services
Medicare Part B’s coverage of telemedicine visits began in 2001. The
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 authorized Medicare coverage of certain
telemedicine services through the physician fee schedule (“PFS”). 54 Since the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress gradually expanded telemedicine
coverage by increasing the list of approved providers, modifying the payment
structure, and expanding the definition of rural areas. The Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), which administers Medicare and Medicaid,
has “increased the number of permissible telehealth services through regulation
by increasing the number of billing codes.” 55 Medicare Part B reimburses for

51.

The Federal Medical Assistance Percentage rate

is determined annually and varies by state according to each state’s per capita
income relative to the U.S. per capita income. The formula provides higher [Federal
Medical Assistance Percentage] rates, or federal reimbursement rates, to states with
lower per capita incomes, and it provides lower [Federal Medical Assistance Percentage]
rates to states with higher per capita incomes.
MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 49, at 16. The statutory minimum Federal Medical Assistance Percentage
rate is fifty percent and the maximum is eighty-three percent. Id. In 2019, following the
expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act, the average federal share of Medicaid was
estimated at sixth-five percent. Id. at 18–19.
52. See JULIA PARADISE, THE K AISER COMM ’N ON MEDICAID & THE U NINSURED, MEDICAID
MOVING FORWARD 2 (2015), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7235.cfm [https://perma.cc/M7PSNDQ8].
53. MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 49, at 1. Approximately twenty percent of the U.S. population
was covered by Medicaid in 2019. Id.
54. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 230, 235 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 REPORT TO CONGRESS], https:
//www.medpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/import_data/scrape_files/docs/default-source/repo
rts/june-2016-report-to-the-congress-medicare-and-the-health-care-delivery-system.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KC69-AU2P].
(CMS) determines the payment rate for each service based on the clinician work
required to provide the service, expenses related to maintaining a practice, and
professional liability insurance (PLI) costs. Payments are adjusted to account for
variations in the input prices in different markets. Medicare’s payment rates also may
be adjusted based on provider characteristics, additional geographic designations, and
other factors. Medicare pays the provider the final calculated amount, less any
beneficiary cost sharing.
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, PHYSICIAN AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONAL PAYMENT
SYSTEM 1 (2021), https://www.medpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/medpac_payment_bas
ics_21_physician_final_sec.pdf [https://perma.cc/P25T-AWUM].
55. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT
POLICY 480 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 REPORT TO CONGRESS], https://www.medpac.gov/wpcontent/uploads/import_data/scrape_files/docs/default-source/reports/mar18_medpac_ent
irereport_sec_rev_0518.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6Z2-997C].
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telemedicine services such as office visits, consultations, psychotherapy, and
certain other medical or health services provided by its approved list of distant
site practitioners, which includes physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician
assistants. 56
Although Medicare’s coverage of telemedicine has expanded, the
number of Medicare patients who were eligible for reimbursement for
telemedicine visits remained very limited. Medicare will only reimburse
telemedicine services for a geographically restricted set of patients. Patients
must be located in a rural Health Professional Shortage Area or a county outside
the Metropolitan Statistical Area, as determined by the Health Resources
and Services Administration and the Census Bureau respectively. 57 Health
Professional Shortage Areas designate areas where there are health care
provider shortages in primary care, mental health, or dental health. 58 A
Metropolitan Statistical Area is essentially a city surrounded by communities that
are economically and socially integrated with the city. 59 Thus, telemedicine
coverage is not available for the millions of Medicare patients who live in urban
areas. The geographic restrictions on telemedicine coverage may help to
reduce fraud because the restrictions limit the Medicare beneficiaries who
can be targeted as part of telemedicine scams.
Even if a beneficiary can meet the geographical restrictions, the patient
must travel to an originating site, 60 such as a physician’s office or hospital, to
use telemedicine services. 61 Patients at originating sites “must use an interactive
audio and video telecommunications system that permits real-time

56. Distant site practitioners who can furnish and receive payment for covered telehealth
services include: physicians, nurse practitioners, physician assistants, nurse-midwives, clinical nurse
specialists, certified registered nurse anesthetists, clinical psychologists and clinical social
workers, and registered dietitians or nutrition professionals. MEDICARE LEARNING NETWORK, CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., TELEHEALTH SERVICES 4 (2020), https://www.cms.gov/Out
reach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/Telehealth
Srvcsfctsht.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CUF-VTU2].
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(m)(4)(c); MEDICARE LEARNING NETWORK, supra note 56, at 3.
58. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., WHAT IS SHORTAGE DESIGNATION? (2021), https://bhw
.hrsa.gov/shortage-designation/hpsas [https://perma.cc/R8LP-CHYJ].
59. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, METROPOLITAN AND MICROPOLITAN: ABOUT (2021), https://www
.census.gov/programs-surveys/metro-micro/about.html [https://perma.cc/FEB4-DQWY].
60. “An originating site is the location where a Medicare [beneficiary] gets physician or
practitioner medical services through a telecommunications system.” MEDICARE LEARNING
NETWORK, supra note 56, at 3.
61. Id. Eligible originating sites include: hospitals, critical access hospitals, physician and
practitioner offices, rural health clinics, federally qualified health centers, hospital-based renal
dialysis centers, skilled nursing facilities, community mental health centers, renal dialysis
facilities, homes of beneficiaries with End-Stage Renal Disease receiving home dialysis, and mobile
stroke units. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(m)(4)(C)(ii).
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communication” between the distant site practitioner 62 and the patient. 63
Therefore, patients are unable to access telemedicine services in their
homes. 64 Medicare pays the originating site a facility fee, which was twenty-five
dollars in 2017, under the PFS for telehealth service, and Medicare pays the
distant site provider the “same rate for services delivered via tele[medicine]
as they would [receive] for the in-person service, as required by [the]
statute.” 65 The originating site requirement makes it less likely that
providers will bill Medicare for sham telemedicine visits. On February 9,
2018, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2018, which expanded the coverage of telemedicine services
under the PFS to include the treatment of strokes in urban areas. 66 It also
permitted accountable care organizations 67 to bill for telemedicine “services
originating from the patient’s residence” in urban areas. 68
In addition to restrictions on which Medicare beneficiaries can receive
telemedicine services and where they can be received, Medicare also restricts
the types of providers who can be reimbursed for telemedicine visits. Only
physicians, and certain other practitioners, such as physician assistants and
nurse practitioners, are eligible to receive Medicare payment for telemedicine
visits. 69 Thus, many health care professionals, such as clinical psychologists
and occupational therapists, are ineligible to furnish and bill for Medicare
telemedicine services.

62. MEDICARE LEARNING NETWORK, supra note 56, at 4. Distant site practitioners who can
furnish and receive payment for covered telehealth services include: physicians, nurse practitioners,
physician assistants, nurse-midwives, clinical nurse specialists, certified registered nurse anesthetists,
clinical psychologists and clinical social workers, and registered dietitians or nutrition
professional. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(m)(4)(C).
63. MEDICARE LEARNING NETWORK, supra note 56, at 4.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(m)(4)(C).
65. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-365, HEALTH CARE: TELEHEALTH & REMOTE
PATIENT MONITORING USE IN MEDICARE AND SELECTED FEDERAL PROGRAMS 8 (2017), https:
//www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-365.pdf [https://perma.cc/74U4-9UHH].
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(m)(6)(A) (explaining that the originating site requirements of 42
U.S.C. § 1395m(m)(4)(C) do “not apply with respect to telehealth services furnished on or after
January 1, 2019, for purposes of diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of symptoms of an acute
stroke, as determined by the Secretary”).
67. Accountable Care Organizations “are groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health care
providers, who come together voluntarily to give coordinated high-quality care to their Medicare
patients.” CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS (ACOS)
(2021), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO [https://perma
.cc/HVD9-SXTZ].
68. 2018 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 55, at 479.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(m)(4)(E); id. § 1395u(b)(18)(C). The practitioners covered include:
physician assistant, nurse practitioner, clinical nurse specialist, certified registered nurse
anesthetist, certified nurse-midwife, clinical social worker, clinical psychologist, and registered
dietician or nutrition professional. Id. § 1395m(m)(4)(E); id. § 1395u(b)(18)(C).
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Medicaid coverage of telemedicine services varies by state and has
become much more expansive in recent years. 70 “Each state has a Medicaid
state plan” that CMS must approve that “describes . . . the services and
populations that are covered under the state’s Medicaid program.” 71 States
differ on whether they should cover telemedicine, what types of telemedicine
they should cover, how telemedicine is provided or covered, which types of
telemedicine providers are covered or reimbursed, and “how much to reimburse
for telemedicine services.” 72 Much like payment for telemedicine services
under Medicare, Medicaid pays for telemedicine services “on an item-byitem basis” with facility-based telemedicine services included as part of “the
fixed payment for a unit of care.” 73
2. COVID-19 and Resulting Coverage Changes
In the early months of 2020, the Federal Government began to express
concern over the global outbreak of COVID-19. 74 By late January, the
Secretary of HHS declared COVID-19 to be a Public Health Emergency. 75 On
January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the coronavirus
outbreak to be a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern.” 76 By

70. CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, STATE TELEHEALTH MEDICAID FEE-FOR-SERVICE
POLICY: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF TELEHEALTH: 2013–2019, at 5 (2020), https://www.cchpca
.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/Historical%20State%20Telehealth%20Medicaid%20Fee%20
For%20Service%20Policy%20Report%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/B675-6YSY].
71. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 65, at 10 n.23.
72. Id. at 9–10.
73. 2018 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 55, at 478.
74. An outbreak of COVID-19 was detected in Wuhan, China in December of 2019. CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, BASICS OF COVID-19 (2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coro
navirus/2019-ncov/your-health/about-covid-19/basics-covid-19.html [https://perma.cc/57Y867LX]. The cause of this outbreak is a new virus, known as the severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). See id. Coronaviruses are a family of viruses that can cause mild-tomoderate upper-respiratory tract illnesses. Id. When an infected person coughs, sneezes, or even
talks, the new coronavirus may be transmitted through expelled droplets. Id. These droplets can
enter a person’s system through the mouth, eyes, or nose. Id. It is also possible for the droplets
to be inhaled into the lungs. Id.
75. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Off. of the Assistant Sec’y for
Preparedness & Response, Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/2019-nCoV.aspx [https://
perma.cc/M4FC-9CA6]. The Secretary of HHS has renewed the public health emergency
approximately every ninety days through January 11, 2023. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs., Admin. for Strategic Preparedness & Response, Renewal of Determination
that a Public Health Emergency Exists (Oct. 13, 2022), https://aspr.hhs.gov/legal/PHE/Pages
/covid19-13Oct2022.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y8DW-6RHW] (noting previous renewals on April
21, 2020, July 23, 2020, October 2, 2020, January 7, 2021, April 15, 2021, July 19, 2021, October
15, 2021, January 14, 2022, April 12, and July 15, 2022).
76. COVID-19 Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) Global Research and
Innovation Forum, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.who.int/publications/m
/item/covid-19-public-health-emergency-of-international-concern-(pheic)-global-research-andinnovation-forum [https://perma.cc/P47C-XGEJ].
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late February and early March 2020, the global outbreak of COVID-19 had
entered a new phase, with community spread occurring in many countries
and several U.S. states. 77 Concerns grew over the potential for the disease to
spread widely, leading to increased hospitalizations and deaths. On March
11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic. 78
On March 13, 2020, President Trump declared the coronavirus pandemic to
be a national emergency. 79
After the declaration of COVID-19 as a Public Health Emergency, CMS
explained that:
[T]here is an urgency to expand the use of technology to help
people who need routine care, and keep vulnerable beneficiaries
and beneficiaries with mild symptoms in their homes while
maintaining access to the care they need. Limiting community
spread of the virus, as well as limiting the exposure to other patients
and staff members will slow viral spread. 80
Accordingly, CMS expanded access to telemedicine services on an emergency
basis under the Social Security Act’s 1135 waiver authority81 and the Coronavirus
Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act. 82 The
expansion applies to three types of virtual services: Medicare telemedicine
visits (live, synchronous visits); virtual check-ins (brief communications through
synchronous discussion over a telephone or exchange of information through
video or image, i.e., store-and-forward); and E-Visits (“non-face-to-face
patient-initiated communications” through online patient portals). 83
The 1135 waivers, which went into effect on March 6, 2020, and remain
in effect until the end of the Public Health Emergency, 84 addressed the
77. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, COVID-19 TIMELINE (2022), https://
bit.ly/3Lv2d2n [https://perma.cc/4GBB-PZFX].
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE TELEMEDICINE HEALTH CARE
PROVIDER FACT SHEET (2020), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/medicare-telemed
icine-health-care-provider-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/LE5M-BX8Y]. The geographic limitation is
set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(m).
81. Under section 1135 of the Social Security Act, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services is authorized to temporarily waive or modify certain Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s
Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”) requirements to ensure that sufficient health care items and
services are available to meet the needs of individuals enrolled in Social Security Act programs.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b–5(b).
82. Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
116-123, § 102, 134 Stat. 146, 156 (2020).
83. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 80.
84. The waivers were initially intended to last for the duration of the Public Health
Emergency, but Congress passed legislation in March 2022 that extended many of the
telemedicine related waivers for 151 days after the end of the Public Health Emergency.
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, tit. III, subtit. A, §§ 301–306, 136
Stat. 49, 804–808 (2022) (providing flexibility extensions for geographic requirements and
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biggest impediments to the adoption of telemedicine. First, CMS waived the
geographic restrictions that limited reimbursement for Medicare telemedicine
visits to patients living in rural areas.85 Thus, Medicare patients all over the
country have access to telemedicine visits for the duration of the Public Health
Emergency.86 In addition, CMS waived the requirement that patients participate
in telemedicine visits from an originating site. 87 During the Public Health
Emergency, patients may participate in telemedicine visits from their home
rather than or in addition to originating sites.88 CMS also waived the requirement
of both audio and video technologies for telemedicine visits, making
telephone (audio only) visits permissible. 89 This change allows the use of
telemedicine visits for underserved populations where broadband is unavailable
or beneficiaries do not have smart phones, tablets, or computers to have a
video connection with their health care providers.
While the waiver of the geographic restrictions is laudable because of
increased access to telemedicine visits, it also makes Medicare and Medicaid
more vulnerable to fraud. A potential telemedicine scam is no longer limited
to rural areas. Fraudsters can now target Medicare beneficiaries in urban
areas. This dramatically increases the number of beneficiaries that fraudsters
can target. It should be noted that in some of the telemedicine scams that
took place prior to the pandemic, the fraudsters worked around the
geographical restriction by not billing for the telemedicine visit itself. 90
Instead, they only billed for the durable medical equipment, genetic tests, or
drugs. 91 With the waiver, the telemedicine companies can get reimbursed for
originating sites, practitioners eligible to furnish telemedicine services, and audio-only
telemedicine services). Conversely, the HHS Office of Civil Rights has indicated that its exercise
of enforcement discretion to not impose penalties on health care providers that fail to comply
with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996), (“HIPAA”) rules will end as soon as the Secretary of HHS declares that the
Public Health Emergency no longer exists or upon the expiration date of the declared Public
Health Emergency. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., GUIDANCE ON HOW THE HIPAA RULES
PERMIT COVERED HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND HEALTH PLANS TO USE REMOTE COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGIES FOR AUDIO-ONLY TELEHEALTH (2022), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-profess
ionals/privacy/guidance/hipaa-audio-telehealth/index.html [https://perma.cc/H9MN-64K5].
Thus, this Article will continue to refer to the waivers and flexibilities expiring at the end of the
Public Health Emergency with the understanding that some of the waivers will last for an additional
151 days.
85. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 80.
86. Id.
87. Id. With respect to telemedicine services for substance use disorder and mental health,
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 116-260, div. CC, tit. I, subtit. B, § 123, 134
Stat. 1182, 2956–2957 (2020) made the waiver permanent. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(m)(7).
88. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 80.
89. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., COVID-19 EMERGENCY DECLARATION BLANKET
WAIVERS FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 1 (2021), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/summ
ary-covid-19-emergency-declaration-waivers.pdf [https://perma.cc/482K-Y8GK].
90. See infra Section III.A.
91. See infra Section III.A.
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the telemedicine visit and the suppliers, pharmacies, or laboratories are also
able to bill Medicare.
Second, CMS waived the restrictions on which types of medical providers
could furnish telemedicine services. 92 Any provider who is eligible to bill
Medicare may now furnish telemedicine services for the duration of the
Public Health Emergency. 93 Much like the waiver of the geographic
restrictions, this was necessary to expand access to telemedicine but also allows
scamsters to target more providers to participate in fraud schemes. Third,
Medicare will reimburse telemedicine visits at the same rate as regular, inperson visits. 94 The change in reimbursement is critical to incentivize
providers to utilize telemedicine visits in lieu of in-person visits. At the
same time, this also incentivizes disreputable telemedicine companies to
increase the number of reimbursements for sham telemedicine visits because
the sham visits are now worth more money. As mentioned previously, in some
of the telemedicine scams the providers did not bill for the telemedicine
visits. 95 Telemedicine was simply the mode for prescribing and ordering
unnecessary durable medical equipment, genetic tests, and drugs. In those
situations, parity is not a driver of the fraud.
Fourth, practitioners can provide telemedicine services to patients with
whom they have no prior doctor-patient relationship. 96 This waiver probably
92. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICIES DURING COVID-19
(2022), https://telehealth.hhs.gov/providers/billing-and-reimbursement/medicare-paymentpolicies-during-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/3R3Q-BKZB].
93. Id.
94. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 80. Prior to the PHE, “most
telehealth services were paid at the lower PFS rate used to pay clinicians providing care in facilities
(the facility-based rate), rather than the higher rate used to pay office-based clinicians (the
nonfacility rate), because the practice expenses associated with furnishing telehealth services
were presumed to be lower.” 2021 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at xxvii.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 90–91.
96. On March 6, 2020, the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 116-123, 134 Stat. 146, 156 (2020), expanded access to
telemedicine and defined “Qualified Provider” of telemedicine services as follows:
(3) QUALIFIED PROVIDER.—The term ‘qualified provider’ means, with respect a
telehealth service (as defined in paragraph (4)(F) of section 1834(m)) furnished to
an individual, a physician or practitioner (as defined in paragraph (4)(D) or
(4)(E), respectively, of such section) who—
(A) furnished to such individual an item or service for which payment was made
under title XVIII during the 3-year period ending on the date such telehealth service
was furnished; or
(B) is in the same practice (as determined by tax identification number) of a
physician or practitioner (as so defined) who furnished such an item or service to such
individual during such period.
Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 116-123,
§ 102(a)(3), 134 Stat. 146, 156 (2020). Under this provision, Medicare would only cover
telemedicine services if the treating physician or someone in her medical practice had a face-toface appointment with that patient in the preceding three years. Essentially, this provision

2. COPELAND_PP_PR1_KC2 (002)_2 (DO NOT DELETE)

86

IOWA LAW REVIEW

11/1/2022 11:37 PM

[Vol. 108:69

poses the greatest fraud risk. If providers do not need to have a prior relationship
with the patient, it is easier to solicit a wide range of Medicare beneficiaries
and hold short telemedicine visits where the provider prescribes or orders
durable medical equipment, drugs, and genetic tests without regard to medical
necessity.
Fifth, OIG permitted health care providers to reduce or waive costsharing (coinsurance and deductibles) for telemedicine visits paid by federal
health care programs without the threat of administrative sanctions. 97 Typically,
a reduction or waiver of cost-sharing obligations would be considered an
inducement for a referral in violation of the federal Anti-Kickback Statute
(“AKS”). 98 It could also be a violation of the civil monetary penalty and
exclusion laws related to kickbacks 99 and the civil monetary penalty law
prohibition on inducements to beneficiaries. 100 OIG noted, however, that they
were not mandating that providers reduce or waive cost-sharing obligation for
telemedicine services during the COVID-19 emergency. 101 Instead, OIG stated
that it will not impose administrative sanctions when arrangements meet
two conditions: “[(1)] A physician or other practitioner reduces or waives
cost-sharing obligations (i.e., coinsurance and deductibles) that a beneficiary
may owe for telehealth services furnished consistent with the then-applicable
coverage and payment rules,” and “[(2)] The telehealth services are furnished
during the time period subject to the COVID-19 Declaration.” 102 Further,
OIG explained that nothing in the policy statement affects a provider’s
“responsibility to bill only for services performed and to comply with legal
authorities related to proper billing, claims submission, cost reporting, or
related conduct.” 103 The policy changes apply to all covered “modalities,

prohibited reimbursement if there was not a preexisting doctor-patient relationship. Section
3703 of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) modified this earlier
federal legislation by eliminating the definition of “Qualified Provider,” which means that
physicians can provide telemedicine services to new patients. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, div. A, tit. III, subtit. D, § 3703, 134 Stat. 281, 416
(2020).
97. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 80; OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OIG POLICY STATEMENT REGARDING PHYSICIANS AND OTHER
PRACTITIONERS THAT REDUCE OR WAIVE AMOUNTS OWED BY FEDERAL HEALTH CARE PROGRAM
BENEFICIARIES FOR TELEHEALTH SERVICES DURING THE 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19)
OUTBREAK 1 (2020) [hereinafter OIG POLICY STMT.], https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsand
bulletins/2020/policy-telehealth-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZMG6-UNXR].
98. OIG POLICY STMT., supra note 97, at 1 (citing Social Security Act § 1128B(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a–7b(b)); see infra Section II.A.
99. Id. (citing Social Security Act §§ 1128(b)(7), 1128A(a)(7), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a–7(a)(7)
to –7a(b)(7)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2.
102. Id. at 1.
103. Id. at 2.
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including telehealth visits, virtual check-in services, e-visits, monthly remote
care management, and monthly remote patient monitoring.” 104
Sixth, CMS waived some of the requirements of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) 105 which limited the use
of telemedicine services. HIPAA is a federal law that protects the privacy and
security of patient information. 106 HHS issued regulations to implement the
requirements of HIPAA. The Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information (“Privacy Rule”) addresses the use and disclosure of
protected health information. 107 Protected health information includes
“[i]ndividually identifiable health information,” 108 which is “held or transmitted
by a covered entity or its business associate, in any form or media, whether
electronic, paper, or oral.” 109 Therefore, when third parties electronically
transmit protected health information to health care providers, the third party
must comply with HIPAA’s Privacy Rule. 110
HIPAA’s requirements apply to covered entities and their “business
associates.” 111 “A business associate is defined as any person who, on behalf of
a covered entity, ‘creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected health

104. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FAQS—OIG POLICY
STATEMENT R EGARDING PHYSICIANS AND OTHER PRACTITIONERS THAT R EDUCE OR W AIVE
AMOUNTS OWED BY FEDERAL HEALTH CARE PROGRAM BENEFICIARIES FOR TELEHEALTH SERVICES
DURING THE 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19) OUTBREAK (2020), https://oig.hhs.gov
/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/2020/telehealth-waiver-faq-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/RHM8XV2F].
105. See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).
106. See generally id. (setting forth HIPAA requirements). Indeed,
HIPAA imposes obligations on health care providers and other “covered
entities,” including health plans and health clearinghouses, regarding their
transmission of “protected health information”. . . .
Under HIPAA, health care providers must treat [protected health information]
consistent with requirements set forth in several HHS regulations known as the
“Privacy Rule,” the “Security Rule,” and the “Breach Notification Rule.”
CHRIS D. LINEBAUGH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10490, HIPAA, TELEHEALTH, AND COVID-19, at 1
(2020).
107. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OCR PRIVACY BRIEF: SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA
PRIVACY RULE 1–3, 19 (2003), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/privacysummary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YS28-UGP8] (citing 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2022)).
108. Id. at 4. “Individually identifiable health information” includes information which
relates to: (1) “the individual’s past, present[,] or future physical or mental health or
condition”; (2) “the provision of health care to the individual”; or (3) “the past, present, or
future payment for the provision of health care.” Id. The information is typically identifiable by
“name, address, birth date, [or] Social Security Number.” Id.
109. Id. at 3.
110. LINEBAUGH, supra note 106, at 3. Third parties that provide technological services to the
health care providers must also comply with the Breach Notification Rule and the Security Rule.
Id.
111. Id. at 2.
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information’ for a HIPAA-covered transaction.” 112 Prior to sharing any protected
health information, covered entities must “enter into a written contract,” a
business associate agreement, “that provides ‘satisfactory assurances’ the
business associate will ‘appropriately safeguard the information.’” 113 In
addition, the business associate agreement must “‘[e]stablish the permitted
and required uses and disclosures of protected health information by the
business associate,’ and it may not authorize the business associate to use
or further disclose the [protected health information] in a manner that, if
done by a covered entity, would violate HIPAA’s requirements.” 114
For purposes of telemedicine, the issue that arises involves the Privacy
Rule’s application to business associates. If a provider uses a video conferencing
provider, the video conferencing provider (as a business associate) would
have to comply with HIPAA’s Privacy Rule because of the disclosure of
protected health information between provider and patient during video
conferencing services. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, HHS Office
for Civil Rights issued a Notice where it indicated that it is using “its
enforcement discretion and will not impose penalties for noncompliance
with the regulatory requirements under the HIPAA Rules against covered
health care providers in connection with the good faith provision of
telehealth during the COVID-19 nationwide public health emergency.” 115
The Notice permits health care providers to “use any [available] nonpublic facing remote communication product” to communicate with
patients. 116 This includes popular applications, such as Zoom, Skype, Apple
FaceTime, or Google Hangouts, that allow for video chats. 117 It does not

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2)(i) (2022)).
115. Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications During
the COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,024, 22,025 (Apr. 21,
2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
116. Id. “A non-public facing remote communication product is one that, as a default, allows
only the intended parties to participate in the communication.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., WHAT IS A “NON-PUBLIC FACING” REMOTE COMMUNICATION PRODUCT? (2020), https://
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/3024/what-is-a-non-public-facing-remote-communic
ation-product/index.html [https://perma.cc/434E-FETH]. Typically, non-public facing
communication platforms
employ end-to-end encryption, which allows only an individual and the person with
whom the individual is communicating to see what is transmitted. The platforms also
support individual user accounts, logins, and passcodes to help limit access and verify
participants. In addition, participants are able to assert some degree of control over
particular capabilities, such as choosing to record or not record the communication
or to mute or turn off the video or audio signal at any point.
Id.
117. Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications During
the COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,025. HHS Office for
Civil Rights explains that “[p]roviders are encouraged to notify patients that these third-
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include, however, Facebook Live, Twitch, TikTok, or other video
communication applications that are public facing. 118 The Notification also
encourages health care providers to seek additional privacy protections by
entering into business associate agreements 119 (“BAAs”) with HIPAA compliant
technology vendors. 120 It mentions several providers that will enter into
HIPAA BAAs including Skype for Business, Zoom for Healthcare, and Cisco
Webex Meetings. 121 These changes made it easier for health care providers to
quickly pivot to providing telemedicine services without worrying about HHS
Office for Civil Rights pursuing the provider for HIPAA violations. At the
same time, however, these changes put patient information at risk. It is
possible that medical records could be illegally shared with or stolen by
third parties and could result in the use of patient information to obtain
unwanted and unnecessary services.
All of these waivers were essential for the expanded use of telemedicine
during the Public Health Emergency. Collectively, however, these provisions
will likely contribute to telemedicine fraud. Once the Public Health Emergency
expires, Medicare’s pre-waiver rules will go back into effect unless lawmakers
act to make some or all of the Public Health Emergency changes permanent.
OIG Deputy Director Christi A. Grimm has recognized that expanding
telemedicine access has offered “opportunities to increase access to
services, decrease burdens for both patients and providers, and enable
better care, including enhanced mental health care.” 122 But she cautions
that policies need to be designed to “achieve these goals and . . . not [be]
compromised by fraud, abuse, or misuse.” 123 Thus, it is imperative that the
Government address issues concerning fraud when they consider the future
of telemedicine regulation.

party applications potentially introduce privacy risks, and providers should enable all available
encryption and privacy modes when using such applications.” Id.
118. Id. Public facing remote communication products “are designed to be open to the
public or allow wide or indiscriminate access to the communication.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., supra note 116.
119. HIPAA’s requirements apply to covered entities and their “business associates.”
LINEBAUGH, supra note 106, at 2. “A business associate is defined as any person who, on behalf
of a covered entity, ‘creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected health information’
for a HIPAA-covered transaction.” Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(1)(i) (2022)).
120. See Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications
During the COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,025.
121. Id.
122. Press Release, Off. of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Statement of
Principal Deputy Inspector General Grimm on Telehealth (Feb. 26, 2021), https://oig.hhs.gov
/coronavirus/letter-grimm-02262021.asp [https://perma.cc/9MJ2-3E6V].
123. Id.
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II. HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND DETECTION
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the DOJ had already begun investigating
and prosecuting telemedicine fraud. The surge in the use of telemedicine
during COVID-19 will likely heighten the DOJ’s focus on rooting out
telemedicine fraud. This Part will focus on the Government’s tools in the fight
against telemedicine fraud. It will first analyze the civil and criminal statutes
used in health care fraud cases and how they apply to telemedicine fraud
cases. Next, it will examine the use of data analytics to detect health care
fraud.
A. PRIMARY FRAUD STATUTES
1. Civil False Claims Act
One of the most important tools for rooting out health care fraud is the
civil False Claims Act (“FCA”). 124 In 2020, the DOJ recovered more than $2.2
billion in FCA settlements with over $1.8 billion related to health care fraud
recoveries. 125 The FCA is prominent in health care fraud prosecutions
because every time health care providers treat Medicare or Medicaid patients,
they submit a claim to the Government for payment. 126 Thus, providers
submit “large numbers of small claims, often amounting to thousands of claims
over the course of a year.”127 In total, “Medicare . . . handles more than [one]
billion claims per year.” 128 The FCA allows the Government to recoup its losses
for false or fraudulent claims made by health care providers. The FCA is
violated whenever any person “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made
or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.” 129

124. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729. The FCA was enacted in 1863 and “was originally aimed principally
at stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by large contractors during the Civil War.” United
States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1976). There is also a criminal False Claims Act, see
18 U.S.C. § 287, which makes it unlawful to knowingly present, or cause to be presented, false or
fraudulent claims paid by the Government. See id. Criminal penalties include imprisonment up
to five years and fines. Id.
125. HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT, supra note 10, at 8; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Justice Department Recovers Over $2.2 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2020
(Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-22-billion-fa
lse-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2020 [https://perma.cc/R5T6-BTT3].
126. In the health care fraud context, a claim is a request for payment for health care that is
accompanied with the necessary information from the health care provider. 42 C.F.R. § 162.1101(a)
(2022).
127. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the
Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 247 (1999).
128. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 2021 TOP MANAGEMENT
AND PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES FACING HHS 11 (2021), https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-pub
lications/top-challenges/2021/2021-tmc.pdf#page=12 [https://perma.cc/H538-B9Y5].
129. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). Knowingly is defined under the statute and means that a
person “has actual knowledge of the information,” or “acts in deliberate ignorance” or a “reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.” Id. § 3729(b)(1). A claim means
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Thus, liability is attached to the claim for payment rather than the underlying
fraudulent activity. Any person who violates the FCA “is liable to the United
States Government for a civil penalty of not less than [$12,537] and not
more than [$25,076] . . . plus 3 times the amount of damages [(treble
damages)] which the Government sustains because of the act of that
person.” 130
The FCA is unique in that private citizens, known as “relators,” can
use their knowledge of a provider’s fraud to bring qui tam suits in the name
of the Government. 131 These whistleblowers are incentivized to bring suits
because they are entitled to between fifteen and thirty percent of the
recovery if the suit is successful. 132 The amount that relators receive depends
on whether the Government decides to intervene in the lawsuit or allow
the relator to pursue it and the extent of the relator’s contribution to the
prosecution. 133 Relators file the suit under seal and the Government has sixty
days to determine whether to take over the case as its own or to leave the case
to the relator to litigate. 134 If the DOJ intervenes in the case, it has primary
responsibility for the prosecution of the case and can settle the action without
the approval of the relator if “the . . . settlement is fair, adequate, and
reasonable under all the circumstances.” 135
There are several types of FCA cases that one would expect to occur in
the telemedicine context. First, there are claims under the FCA for billing for
items or services not actually rendered. 136 Thus, the provider would submit a
bill to Medicare or Medicaid that claims the health care provider performed
services, such as a patient consultation, via telemedicine when in fact the
health care provider did not furnish any services to the beneficiary. There may
also be situations where technical difficulties during the telemedicine visit

any request or demand . . . for money or property . . . that[:] (i) is presented to an
officer, employee, or agent of the United States; or (ii) is made to a contractor,
grantee, or other recipient, if the money or property is to be spent or used on the
Government’s behalf or to advance a Government program or interest [and if
the Government will provide or reimburse any portion of the money or property
requested].
Id. § 3729(b)(2).
130. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(G); 28 C.F.R. § 85.5 (2022) (adjusting the penalty for violations of the
FCA).
131. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c).
132. Id. § 3730(d).
133. Id.
134. Id. § 3730(b)(2). If the Government has good cause, it can move the court for an
extension of the 60-day time period. Id. § 3730(b)(3).
135. Id. § 3730(c)(1)–(2).
136. MED. LEARNING NETWORK, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE FRAUD &
ABUSE: PREVENT, DETECT, REPORT 12 (2021), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education
/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/Fraud-Abuse-MLN4649244.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7C36-3AZK].
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prevent the health care provider from rendering services, but the provider
still bills for those services.
Second, a provider might bill for medically unnecessary services or items
provided. 137 Under federal law, Medicare Parts A and B will not pay for
services unless those services are “reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or
treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body
member.” 138 Therefore, if a laboratory submits a claim for reimbursement
for medically unnecessary laboratory tests, that is an actionable violation of
the FCA. Most of the telemedicine scams discussed in this Article involve
one or both of these first two types of FCA cases.
Third, DME providers may submit claims that were generated “pursuant
to a prohibited telephone solicitation.” 139 The Social Security Act only allows
DME suppliers to make unsolicited phone calls in three specific situations:
(1) The beneficiary gave written permission; (2) the supplier has provided
a covered item to the individual and is only contacting the individual
concerning that covered item; or (3) the supplier has furnished a covered
item to the individual within the fifteen-month period preceding the
contact. 140 If the DME supplier submits a claim in violation of the rule, no
payment may be made for the covered item or service. 141 It is considered a
false claim for purposes of the FCA. 142 DME suppliers have also violated the
law by “us[ing] independent marketing firms to make unsolicited calls to
Medicare beneficiaries.” 143 All of the telemedicine scams involving DME
suppliers utilize marketing firms to collect the beneficiary information
needed for the billing scheme.
Fourth, telemedicine providers may submit bills for excessive services or
items provided. 144 In this situation, the patient likely has some need for
services or items, but not enough to justify the quantity of services or items
billed by the telemedicine provider.
Fifth, providers might have coding errors or engage in upcoding. 145
Accurate coding is crucial in telemedicine because of all of the pre–Public Health
Emergency reimbursement constraints on the type of provider, geographic
location of patient, originating site, and type of service provided. The

137.
Id.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A).
139. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., UPDATED SPECIAL FRAUD
ALERT: TELEMARKETING BY DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS (2010), https://oig.hhs.gov
/documents/special-fraud-alerts/868/fraudalert_telemarketing.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPG2WTWM].
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(a)(17)(A).
141. Id. § 1395m(a)(17)(B).
142. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 139.
143. Id.
144. MED. LEARNING NETWORK, supra note 136, at 7.
145. Id.
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reimbursement codes vary based on these and many other factors. “Upcoding
is when a provider assigns an inaccurate billing code to a medical procedure
or treatment to increase reimbursement.”146 For example, if a nurse conducts
the telemedicine appointment, but the doctor’s office submits the claim as if
the doctor conducted the appointment because designating the doctor as
the provider leads to a higher reimbursement, that would be upcoding.
Sixth, providers might unbundle a bill to submit separate claims for
what was essentially one procedure or item. 147 For example, if a laboratory
runs several tests on a patient’s blood it should be submitted as one bill with
a global billing code that encompasses the various tests, but the laboratory
might claim that the tests were run on multiple days and submit separate bills
that each contain a billing code for the applicable test. Although the global
billing code for multiple tests would provide a higher reimbursement than
the billing code for one test, it is less than would result from claiming each
test separately. 148 Unbundling the bills in this manner allows the provider to
claim a greater reimbursement for the service provided.
2. Anti-Kickback Statute
The Federal health care program AKS, 149 which is often at the forefront
of criminal health care fraud enforcement efforts, was enacted to prevent

146. Id.
147. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, https://www.fbi.gov/scams-andsafety/common-scams-and-crimes/health-care-fraud [https://perma.cc/WS32-EJSZ]; MED.
LEARNING NETWORK, supra note 136, at 7.
148. LAURA F. LAEMMLE-WEIDENFELD, AM. HEALTH L. ASS’N, LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE
FRAUD AND ABUSE 435–36 (5th ed. 2020).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b). The Anti-Kickback statute provides:
(b)(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly,
in cash or in kind—
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging
for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole
or in part under a Federal health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or
recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item
for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care
program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$100,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including any
kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind to any person to induce such person—
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under a Federal health care program, or
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payments to doctors in exchange for patient referrals to other health care
providers. 150 The concern with these types of payments is that the health care
provider may make care decisions based on financial incentives rather than
the best interests of the patient. 151 There is also the concern that “financial
rewards to providers for patient referrals might drive up [federal health care]
program costs by encouraging the provision of unnecessary or inordinately
expensive medical care.” 152
The AKS makes it unlawful to: (1) knowingly and willfully 153; (2) offer or
pay, solicit or receive; (3) any remuneration; (4) to induce the referral of
an individual to another person or entity “for the furnishing of any item
or service,” or to induce the purchasing or ordering of such item or service;
(5) payable “in whole or in part” by a federal health care program, such as
Medicare and Medicaid. 154 As a criminal statute, intent is an essential
element of an AKS violation. When evaluating intent, courts will often
apply the one purpose test: If one purpose of the payment is to obtain
referrals, then the requisite intent is established even if there may be other,
legitimate reasons for the remuneration. 155 Remuneration is broadly defined
as “anything of value.” 156
Criminal conviction under the AKS may lead to a criminal fine of up
to $100,000 and/or up to ten years imprisonment, as well as mandatory
exclusion from participation in Medicare and Medicaid (an administrative
sanction). 157 Exclusion is the most powerful penalty because it can put an

(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing,
or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under a Federal health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$100,000 or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
Id.
150. See id.
151. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST
& ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 707 (6th ed.
2008).
152. Id.
153. Id. Importantly, the Affordable Care Act explains that a defendant “need not have actual
knowledge of . . . or specific intent to commit a violation of” the anti-kickback statute. The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §6402(f)(2), 124 Stat. 119,
1008 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(h) (2010)).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b)(1) to –7b(b)(2).
155. United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69 (3d Cir. 1985).
156. See, e.g., United States ex rel. McDonough v. Symphony Diagnostic Servs., Inc., 36 F. Supp.
3d 773, 777–78 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (explaining that for purposes of the AKS, remuneration is
“anything of value”).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7(a) to –7b(b).
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entity out of business. Due to the risk of exclusion, many entities settle their
cases with the Government. 158
The language of the AKS is incredibly broad and criminalizes many
potentially beneficial business practices and compensation arrangements. 159
Accordingly, AKS contains a number of statutory exceptions 160 and safe
harbors 161 that designate commercial arrangements as legal that would
otherwise violate the plain language of AKS. 162 If a provider engages in a
transaction that satisfies all of the elements of a safe harbor provision, the
Government will not prosecute the provider even if unlawful intent is present. 163
The AKS is a criminal statute, but in addition to criminal liability, AKS
allegations are also brought in conjunction with claims under the Civil Monetary
Penalties Law 164 and the FCA. 165 There is no private right of action under the
AKS, but whistleblowers can sue for AKS violations through the FCA. 166 The
AKS violation means that the claims are considered “false” for purposes of the
FCA even if the items or services were provided as claimed. 167 Together, these
158. See generally Katrice Bridges Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, 87 IND. L.J. 1033 (2012) (“By
entering into these civil administrative settlements, the pharmaceutical manufacturers are able
to avoid the collateral consequences of criminal conviction. Importantly, . . . the manufacturer
will not be excluded from participation in federal health care programs.”). These settlements are
reached through Corporate Integrity Agreements, negotiated by OIG. Id. at 1042–44. The health
care provider pays a fine, agrees to remedial measures such as hiring a compliance officer, and
in exchange, OIG does not seek exclusion of the provider from participation in federal health
care programs. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CORPORATE
INTEGRITY AGREEMENTS, https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements [https
://perma.cc/4ZRM-AZAH].
159. LAEMMLE-WEIDENFELD, supra note 148, at 31 (explaining that “common arrangements
[such] as joint ventures, space and equipment leases, discounts on goods and services, physician
recruitment incentives, management and personal services contracts, physician practice acquisition,
and even employment arrangements” must be examined in the context of AKS).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b)(3)(A)–(K).
161. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2022).
162. In 1987, Congress required HHS to create regulatory safe harbors. Medicare &
Medicaid Patient & Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–93, 101 Stat. 680, 682,
697 (1987). Congress explained that “the breadth of [AKS] created uncertainty among health
care providers as to which commercial arrangements are legitimate, and which are” prohibited.
S. REP. NO. 100-109, pt. 3, at 27 (1987).
163. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Issuance of Advisory
Opinions by the OIG, 62 Fed. Reg. 7350, 7351 (Feb. 19, 1997) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1008).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7a. The Civil Monetary Penalties Law includes a prohibition
against offering or transferring remuneration to a Medicare or state health care program
beneficiary that a “person knows or should know is likely to influence” beneficiary selection
of a “particular provider . . . for which payment may be made, in whole or in part” by Medicare
or a state health care program. Id. § 1320a–7a(a)(5).
165. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(g).
167. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”), Pub. L. No. 11148, § 6402(f)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 759 (2010), provided that “a claim that includes items or
services resulting from a violation of [the AKS] constitutes a false or fraudulent claim” for
purposes of the FCA. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(g).

2. COPELAND_PP_PR1_KC2 (002)_2 (DO NOT DELETE)

96

IOWA LAW REVIEW

11/1/2022 11:37 PM

[Vol. 108:69

laws and regulations have resulted in massive liabilities for many health
care providers. 168
Kickback exposure can arise in telemedicine cases whenever a telemedicine
company offers laboratory services, DME, or prescriptions by affiliated providers.
For example, if there is a financial relationship between the health care
provider who orders orthotics and the DME supplier that fulfills the order,
that could run afoul of the AKS. All of the telemedicine fraud schemes to date
involve these types of kickbacks. 169 In kickback situations, it could be that the
provider is furnishing a good or service that the provider would not have
furnished but for the kickback because the service is unnecessary. It is also
possible that the provider is furnishing a good or service that is necessary but,
in the absence of a kickback, a competitor would provide the service. While
the former appears more egregious because it will increase program costs and
lead to overutilization, either situation will be enough to make out a false
claim based on a violation of the AKS. The Government need not demonstrate
patient harm or monetary loss to federal health care programs as a prerequisite
to recovery under the AKS. 170
B. FRAUD DETECTION
The HHS OIG is responsible for the oversight of Medicare and
Medicaid. 171 OIG conducts investigations into Medicare and Medicaid fraud,
waste, and abuse. 172 OIG also imposes administrative sanctions on health care
providers that have committed prohibited acts such as health care fraud. 173
Traditionally, OIG utilized a “pay-and-chase” model where they attempted
to recover fraudulent claims after the Government paid them. 174 Increasingly,
however, OIG is using predictive analytics 175 to identify fraudulent claims prior
to payment.
168. LAEMMLE-WEIDENFELD, supra note 148, at 31–33 (providing examples of multimillion
dollar settlements over the past 20 years such as Pfizer’s 2009 settlement for $1 billion that was
brought under the FCA for violations of the AKS).
169. See, e.g., supra Section II.A.
170. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FRAUD & ABUSE LAWS,
https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/fraud-abuse-laws [https://perma.cc/G9WT
-VNBC].
171. Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 83 Fed. Reg.
55553, 55553–54 (Nov. 6, 2018).
172. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL 1 (2022), https://oig.hhs.gov/documents/root/1037/About-OIG-Fact-Sheet-June2022
.pdf [https://perma.cc/TB9D-32XK].
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7a (authorizing OIG to seek civil monetary penalties and exclusion
from participation in federal health care programs for a variety of health care fraud violations).
174. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO–13–104, MEDICARE FRAUD PREVENTION: CMS
HAS IMPLEMENTED A PREDICTIVE A NALYTICS SYSTEM, BUT NEEDS TO DEFINE MEASURES TO
DETERMINE ITS EFFECTIVENESS 5, 9–10 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-13-104.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N4MV-CVBD].
175. Predictive analysis focuses on statistics to predict outcomes. Id.
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Rooting out health care fraud has always been “a resource-intensive
endeavor.” 176 Indeed, every Medicare or Medicaid claim includes “dozens
of pieces of information to regulators, including the patient’s name and date
of birth, the place and date of service, the current procedural terminology
(CPT) code that describes the service provided, and the supporting diagnosis
code.” 177 The OIG uses the claims data proactively to identify patterns of fraud
and reactively to corroborate or refute allegations of fraud. 178 OIG does this
through data analytics which is “the process of examining data sets to draw
conclusions and identify patterns about the information they contain.” 179
In 2011, CMS’s Center for Program Integrity launched its Fraud Prevention
System. 180 “The [Fraud Prevention System] uses predictive analytics—
sophisticated mathematical and statistical algorithms and models—to identify
suspicious behavior.” 181 The Fraud Prevention System examines information
from multiple Medicare and other data sources to predict fraudulent
billing patterns or trends. 182 The Fraud Prediction System runs predictive
models on all Medicare Part A and Part B fee-for-service claims prior to
payment to identify suspicious billing patterns. 183 Once the system
identifies suspicious activity, it “automatically generates and prioritizes
leads for review and investigation.” 184 Investigations of Fraud Prevention
176. Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud: Reflections on a Modern-Day Yellow
Brick Road, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 343, 348 (2010) (explaining that because reimbursement is based
on proper documentation, it is possible “to hide wrongdoing within a complex set of documents or
electronic communications”).
177. Jason Mehta & Jennifer A. Short, Big Data Makes Big Cases: How Data Analytics Is Shaping
False Claims Act Enforcement, 67 FED. LAW. 43, 43 (2020).
178. Id. at 43–44.
179. Julian L. André & Justin P. Murphy, The Growing Role of Data Analytics in Healthcare
Enforcement, THE NAT’L L. REV (Jan. 15, 2022), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/growingrole-data-analytics-healthcare-enforcement [https://perma.cc/4J46-44H2].
180. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., REPORT
TO CONGRESS FRAUD PREVENTION SYSTEM FIRST IMPLEMENTATION YEAR 1 (2012), https://www
.cms.gov/About-CMS/Components/CPI/Widgets/Fraud_Prevention_System_Report_toCongr
ess1stYear.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW9L-WJ3F].
181. Id. at 4.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 4, 42. There are three distinct categories of model that have varying levels of
complexities. First, there are rule-based models, which are designed to identify potentially
fraudulent claims and behaviors as well as target fraud that is related to specific services, such as
DME suppliers. U.S. GOV’ T A CCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 174, at 13. Second, there are
anomaly-detection models which are designed to pinpoint abnormal provider patterns by
analyzing “data collected over a period of time, and comparisons of those patterns to established
behaviors that have been determined to be reasonable.” Id. at 13–14. Third, there are predictive
models, which are designed “to use historical data to identify patterns associated with fraud, and
then use these data to identify certain potentially fraudulent behaviors when applied to current
claims data.” Id. at 14. Predictive models are the most complex because they “require detection
of several patterns of behavior that individually may not be suspicious but, when conducted
together, can indicate fraudulent activity.” Id.
184. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 180, at 5.
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System leads may result in CMS taking a variety of administrative actions
“including implementation of claims processing edits, claim denials, prepayment
review, payment suspensions, revocation of Medicare billing privileges, and
referral to law enforcement.” 185
The use of data analytics makes OIG less reliant on qui tam whistleblower
complaints and has already led to a significant increase in the number of DOJ
initiated FCA cases. 186 In 2020, the DOJ initiated more than twice as many
health-care-related FCA cases than it did in 2019, resulting in the most DOJ
initiated FCA cases on record. 187 The number of health care related qui tam
FCA cases in 2020 remained relatively unchanged from 2019, with less than
a one percent increase in the number of cases. 188
III. TELEMEDICINE FRAUD
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, federal health care fraud enforcement
in the area of telemedicine was already on the rise. The Government’s
enforcement efforts have been directed at what they term “telefraud,” which
are scams that inappropriately leverage the reach of telemarketing schemes. 189
The schemes rely upon unscrupulous medical providers who conduct sham
remote visits for the purpose of billing fraudulently for DME or genetic tests.
The conspirators in the scams include telemedicine company executives, medical
providers, marketers, and business owners who work collectively to trick
hundreds of thousands of unsuspecting Medicare beneficiaries. The expansion
of telemedicine coverage during the Public Health Emergency and the
possibility that it will become permanent once the Public Health Emergency
ends means that these types of scams could become more prevalent. This Part
will explain how these scams work and discuss some of the most prominent
takedowns of these scams in the past several years. It will also analyze the
scams through the lens of the Fraud Triangle.
A. TELEMEDICINE SCAMS (TELEFRAUD)
In most of the fraudulent schemes, either telemedicine executives or
DME suppliers or laboratories have a relationship with a marketing company.
The marketing company targets Medicare and Medicaid recipients through
185. Id. at 4–5.
186. André & Murphy, supra note 179.
187. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIV. DIV., FRAUD STATISTICS – OVERVIEW: OCTOBER 1, 1986 – SEPTEMBER
30, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1354316/download [https://perma
.cc/FE52-74T9].
188. See id. In 2020, there were 456 health-care-related qui tam cases compared to 117 DOJ
initiated health-care-related FCA cases. Id. In 2019, there were 450 health-care-related qui tam
cases compared to fifty-seven DOJ initiated health-care-related FCA cases compared to 450 qui
tam cases. Id. Thus, the ratio of qui tam to DOJ initiated cases has gone from approximately
eight to one to approximately four to one in the course of one year.
189. Press Release, Off. of Inspector Gen., supra note 122 (distinguishing telefraud from
other telehealth fraud schemes).
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call centers, direct mail, television ads, and internet pop-up ads. 190 The
marketing company gathers Medicare or Medicaid information from the
recipients. 191 At that point, the marketing company provides the information to
the telemedicine company or the DME supplier or laboratory.192 Health care
providers who work for the telemedicine company then prepare orders or
write prescriptions for unnecessary laboratory tests or DME such as knee
braces. 193 The health care providers may have spoken with the beneficiaries
briefly through a telemedicine visit or not at all. 194 The DME companies
or laboratories then send the orthotic braces or perform tests on the
beneficiary. 195 The DME companies or laboratories submit claims to
Medicare for reimbursement. 196 The telemedicine company may or may not
submit claims for reimbursement for the telemedicine consultation. 197 The
DME companies or laboratories pay the telemedicine company, 198 and the
telemedicine company pays the providers for writing the orders and
prescriptions. 199 Either the telemedicine company or the DME companies
or laboratories pay the marketing company. 200 Telemedicine allows the
schemes to be conducted on a very large scale because in-person doctor visits
are not necessary.
The “telefraud” schemes have been so prevalent that on July 20, 2022,
OIG took the extraordinary step of issuing a Special Fraud Alert to warn
practitioners of the danger of entering into arrangements with telemedicine
companies. 201 In the Special Fraud Alert, OIG decries the use of kickbacks to
recruit practitioners into fraudulent schemes that typically involve practitioners
ordering medically unnecessary items and services for patients with whom
they have “ha[d] limited, if any, interaction.” 202 The Special Fraud Alert includes
190. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 12.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. SPECIAL FRAUD ALERT, supra note 18, at 1. From 1994 to 2022, OIG has only issued
twelve Special Fraud Alerts, with some being updates to earlier Special Fraud Alerts. OFF. OF
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SPECIAL FRAUD ALERTS, BULLETINS, AND
OTHER GUIDANCE, https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/alerts [https://perma.cc/4CJK-95XR].
202. SPECIAL FRAUD ALERT, supra note 18, at 1. OIG explains that:
Such payments are sometimes described as payment per review, audit, consult, or
assessment of medical charts. Telemedicine Companies often tell Practitioners that
they do not need to contact the purported patient or that they only need speak to
the purported patient by telephone. In addition, Practitioners are not given an
opportunity to review the purported patient’s real medical records. Furthermore,
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an illustrative list of eight “suspect characteristics” of agreements between
practitioners and telemedicine companies which could demonstrate “a
heightened risk of fraud and abuse.” 203 For example, they note that it is
suspicious if the patients have been “recruited” by the telemedicine
company or obtained through internet advertising. 204 Further, it is also
suspicious if the telemedicine company is restricting the practitioner’s
treatment options by only furnishing a particular product or service such as
genetic testing. 205 OIG was careful to note that the “Special Fraud Alert is
not intended to discourage legitimate telehealth arrangements” and that
many practitioners used telemedicine during the Public Health
Emergency to provide appropriate treatment to their patients. 206

the Telemedicine Company may direct Practitioners to order or prescribe a
preselected item or service, regardless of medical necessity or clinical appropriateness.
In many cases, the Telemedicine Company sells the order or prescription
generated by Practitioners to other individuals or entities that then fraudulently
bill for the unnecessary items and services.
Id.
203.

SPECIAL FRAUD ALERT, supra note 18, at 4–5. The eight suspicious characteristics include:

The purported patients for whom the Practitioner orders or prescribes
items or services were identified or recruited by the Telemedicine Company,
telemarketing company, sales agent, recruiter, call center, health fair,
and/or through internet, television or social media advertising for free or
low out-of-pocket cost items or services.

The Practitioner does not have sufficient contact with or information
from the purported patient to meaningfully assess the medical necessity
of the items or services ordered or prescribed.

The Telemedicine Company compensates the Practitioner based on
the volume of items or services ordered or prescribed, which may be
characterized to the Practitioner as compensation based on the number
of purported medical records that the Practitioner reviewed.

The Telemedicine Company only furnishes items and services to Federal
health care program beneficiaries and does not accept insurance from
any other payor.

The Telemedicine Company claims to only furnish items and services
to individuals who are not Federal health care program beneficiaries but
may in fact bill Federal health care programs.

The Telemedicine Company only furnishes one product or a single class
of products (e.g., durable medical equipment, genetic testing, diabetic
supplies, or various prescription creams), potentially restricting a
Practitioner’s treating options to a predetermined course of treatment.

The Telemedicine Company does not expect Practitioners (or another
Practitioner) to follow up with purported patients nor does it provide
Practitioners with the information required to follow up with purported
patients (e.g., the Telemedicine Company does not require Practitioners
to discuss genetic testing results with each purported patient).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
204. Id. at 4.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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Several recent examples of scams uncovered by the DOJ demonstrate the
magnitude of these schemes. On April 9, 2019, the DOJ announced charges
against twenty-four defendants, including executives “of five telemedicine
companies, the owners of dozens of . . . DME[] companies[,] and three
licensed medical professionals, for their participation in health care fraud
schemes” with over $1.2 billion in losses. 207 They called the takedown Operation
Brace Yourself, and its focus was on DME companies paying bribes and
kickbacks to medical professionals working with telemedicine companies
to order unnecessary back, shoulder, wrist, and knee braces for Medicare
beneficiaries. 208
One of the defendants, who ultimately pled guilty to conspiracy to
commit health care fraud and filing a false tax return, was Kelly Wolfe. 209 The
case against Kelly Wolfe and her company, Regency, Inc., a DME billing
and consulting company, began as a qui tam action by a former Regency
employee. 210 Wolfe and Regency worked with a group of telemarketing
companies owned by Patsy Truglia (who was also charged and pled guilty) 211
and a telemedicine company called Comprehensive Telcare as part of the
scheme. 212 Wolfe and her co-conspirators used Regency to establish dozens
of DME shell companies in the names of straw owners for Truglia with the
purpose of spreading DME claims across several entities to evade Medicare
scrutiny. 213 Truglia’s telemarketing companies targeted Medicare beneficiaries
and collected information about them. 214 Comprehensive Telcare then
“utilized an internet-based platform that employed computer-programmed
macros to create bogus supporting medical practitioner orders,” which their
medical providers signed electronically in exchange for bribes without any

207. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 24.
208. Id.; U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, BILLION-DOLLAR MEDICARE FRAUD BUST
(2019), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/billion-dollar-medicare-fraud-bust-040919 [https://
perma.cc/Z7A5-QMV7].
209. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Florida Businesswoman Pleads Guilty to Criminal
Health Care and Tax Fraud Charges and Agrees to $20.3 Million Civil False Claims Act Settlement
(Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/florida-businesswoman-pleads-guilty-criminal
-health-care-and-tax-fraud-charges-and-agrees-203 [https://perma.cc/F8PP-EU77].
210. Id.; Settlement Agreement at 2–13, United States ex rel. Albright v. Regency, Inc., No.
19-cv-00686 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2021).
211. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., South Florida Man Sentenced to 15 Years for
Consecutive Health Care Fraud Conspiracies (Feb. 2, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/usaomdfl/pr/south-florida-man-sentenced-15-years-consecutive-health-care-fraud-conspiracies [https
://perma.cc/WBV6-JHQK] (noting that a judge sentenced Truglia to fifteen years in prison and
that he was also ordered to pay $18.3 million to the affected government health care programs).
212. Second Superseding Information at 1–14, United States v. Truglia, No. 20-cr-00058
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2021).
213. Plea Agreement at 31–32, United States v. Wolfe, No. 21-cr-00028 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27,
2021); Plea Agreement at 22–23, Truglia, No. 8-20-cr-00058 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2021).
214. Plea Agreement, Wolfe, supra note 213, at 31–32; Plea Agreement, Truglia, supra note
213, at 22–23.
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contact with Medicare beneficiaries. 215 The telemedicine vendor would then
transmit signed DME orders to Regency and the other DME fronts. 216
Regency and the other DME fronts then billed Medicare for the unnecessary
DME equipment in exchange for five percent of paid claims.217 Wolfe and her
co-conspirators “submitted well over $400 million in illegal DME claims to
Medicare and the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the” Department
of Veteran Affairs. 218 In addition to the criminal charges, Wolfe and her
company have agreed to pay over $20.3 million for FCA violations. 219
Later that same year, the DOJ announced indictments in Operation
Double Helix, which involved a scheme where genetic testing laboratories
paid illegal kickbacks and bribes to medical professionals working with
telemedicine companies in exchange for ordering expensive and medically
unnecessary cancer genetic tests. 220 The “defendants fraudulently billed
Medicare more than $2.1 billion for these . . . tests.” 221
As part of Operation Double Helix, the DOJ indicted Jamie Simmons,
owner of telemedicine company MedSymphony, LLC. 222 Through
MedSymphony, Simmons supplied fraudulent orders for cancer genomic
testing 223 to be used to support Medicare claims by three laboratories for
Medicare beneficiaries supplied by two marketing companies. 224 The doctors’
orders for cancer genomic testing were written by doctors working for
MedSymphony, and Medicare only reimbursed for cancer genomic testing
when (1) the beneficiary had cancer and (2) the beneficiary’s treating
physician determined that the testing was needed for the treatment of the
beneficiary’s cancer. 225 But the MedSymphony “doctors were not treating the
beneficiaries for cancer or symptoms of cancer, did not use the test results
in the treatment of the beneficiaries, had no physician-patient relationship
or, at times, any contact with the beneficiaries, and did not conduct a proper
215. Plea Agreement, Truglia, supra note 213, at 22–24.
216. Id.; Plea Agreement, Wolfe, supra note 213, at 31–34.
217. Plea Agreement, Wolfe, supra note 213, at 34; Plea Agreement, Truglia, supra note 213,
at 23.
218. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just, supra note 209.
219. Exhibit A Settlement Agreement at 4, Albright v. Regency, Inc., No. 19-cv-00686 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 19, 2021).
220. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Federal Law Enforcement Action Involving Fraudulent
Genetic Testing Results in Charges Against 35 Individuals Responsible for Over $2.1 Billion
in Losses in One of the Largest Health Care Fraud Schemes Ever Charged (Sept. 27, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-law-enforcement-action-involving-fraudulent-genetictesting-results-charges-against [https://perma.cc/X3WU-X7FJ].
221. Id.
222. Indictment at 8, United States v. Simmons, No. 19-cr-60273 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2019).
223. Id. at 6 (“Cancer genomic (“CGx”) testing used DNA sequencing to detect mutations in
genes that could indicate a higher risk of developing certain types of cancers in the future. CGx
testing was not a method of diagnosing whether an individual presently had cancer.”).
224. Id. at 8, 11.
225. Id. at 7.
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telemedicine visit, and often never contacted the beneficiaries.” 226 Along
with his co-conspirators, Simmons caused the three laboratories to submit
more than $56 million in claims for fraudulent cancer genomic tests. 227
Simmons pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit health care
fraud 228 and was sentenced to thirty-five months imprisonment and ordered
to pay over $2.5 million in restitution. 229
In Fall 2020, the DOJ announced the largest health care fraud takedown
in its history, which resulted in charges against 345 defendants who were
responsible for $6 billion in losses.230 The telemedicine portion of the takedown,
Operation Rubber Stamp, was responsible for $4.5 billion in losses. 231
As part of Operation Rubber Stamp, the DOJ charged two nurse
practitioners with conspiracy to commit health care fraud for their involvement
in telefraud. Mark Allen Hill, a nurse practitioner licensed in several states
who was a Medicare provider, worked for a telemedicine company called
Integrated Support Plus, Inc. (“Integrated”). 232 As a nurse practitioner in
the state of Montana, Hill was able to prescribe DME to patients without
oversight by a licensed physician.233 The DME providers had arrangements with
telemarketing companies and telemedicine companies: They paid the
telemarketing companies for a set number of completed brace orders signed
by medical providers and paid the telemarketing companies a fixed price for
each brace; then, the telemarketing companies would make and receive
calls from Medicare beneficiaries and determine whether the beneficiaries
were eligible to receive braces. 234 They would then obtain the needed
medical information from the beneficiaries and fill out the brace
prescriptions, and they would send the unsigned brace prescriptions and
payment to Integrated to obtain a Medicare provider’s signature. 235
Integrated paid Medicare providers, including Hill, to review and sign brace
prescriptions. 236 Hill did “so regardless of medical necessity, in the absence
of a pre-existing medical provider-patient relationship, without a physical
examination, and frequently based solely on a short telephonic conversation”
with the beneficiary or without any conversation with the beneficiary at
226. Id. at 11.
227. Id. at 12.
228. See Agreed Factual Basis for Guilty Plea at 3, Simmons, No. 19-cr-60273 (S.D. Fla. Feb.
28, 2020); Judgment in a Criminal Case at 1, Simmons, No. 19-cr-60273 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2020),
ECF No. 54.
229. Judgment in a Criminal Case, supra note 228, at 1.
230. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 16.
231. Id.
232. Indictment at 2, United States v. Hill, No. 20-cr-00067 (D. Mont. Sept. 3, 2020), ECF
No. 4.
233. Id. at 4.
234. Id. at 7.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 7–8.
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all. 237 The DME companies then submitted claims to Medicare using the
signed brace prescriptions. 238 Neither Hill nor Integrated billed Medicare
for the telemedicine consultations with beneficiaries. 239 Hill participated
in this scheme from October 2017 until April 2019. 240 He signed roughly
7,097 brace orders. 241 The scheme led to the submission of over $10 million
in false and fraudulent claims to Medicare. 242 After a guilty plea, Hill was
sentenced to nine months in jail and three years of supervised release. 243 He
was also ordered to pay over $5 million in restitution. 244
On May 25, 2021, the DOJ announced an indictment in the first
pandemic-related telemedicine takedown. 245 Leonel Palatnik, co-owner of
Panda Conservation Group, LLC (“Panda”), a Texas company that owned
and operated testing laboratories, was indicted “for his role in a $73 million
conspiracy to defraud Medicare by paying kickbacks to a telemedicine company
to arrange for doctors to authorize medically unnecessary genetic testing.” 246
The DOJ explained that “[t]he scheme exploited temporary amendments to
telehealth restrictions enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic that were
intended to ensure access to care for Medicare beneficiaries.” 247 For
marketing purposes, Panda used the brand name the Health Awareness
Project “to target Medicare beneficiaries interested in genetic testing and
to obtain their insurance information and DNA material for testing at
Panda’s laboratories.” 248 Palatnik then offered and paid kickbacks and bribes
of $50,000 per month to Michael Stein, through his entity 1523 Holdings,
LLC (“1523”), in exchange for Stein arranging for telemedicine providers
to order genetic testing for the targeted Medicare beneficiaries. 249 Stein
then referred the Panda-recruited patients to health care providers in exchange
for them ordering medically unnecessary genetic testing. 250 The health care
237. Id. at 8.
238. Id. at 7.
239. Id. at 10.
240. Id. at 8–9.
241. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Nurse Practitioners Sentenced to Prison for Health
Care Fraud (July 30, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mt/pr/nurse-practitioners-sentencedprison-health-care-fraud [https://perma.cc/K5UT-W578].
242. Indictment, supra note 232, at 11.
243. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 241.
244. Id.
245. See Indictment at 1, United States v. Stein, No. 21-20321 (S.D. Fla. May 25, 2021).
246. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Laboratory Owner Pleads Guilty to $73 Million
Medicare Kickback Scheme (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/laboratory-ownerpleads-guilty-73-million-medicare-kickback-scheme-0 [https://perma.cc/6MNA-U335]; Plea
Agreement at 6–7, United States v. Palatnik, No. 21-cr-20321 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2021); Indictment
at 12, Stein, No. 21-20321 (S.D. Fla. May 25, 2021).
247. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 246.
248. Agreed Factual Basis for Guilty Plea at 2, Palatnik, No. 21-cr-20321 (Aug. 31, 2021).
249. Id.
250. Indictment, supra note 245, at 10–11.
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providers used the Medicare beneficiary information provided by Stein and
Palatnik to have telemedicine consultations through Stein’s companies and
order genetic testing. 251 Oftentimes, the health care providers were not
treating the beneficiaries for any specific medical condition, had no prior
relationship with the beneficiaries, and did not use the results of the genetic
tests in the treatment of the beneficiaries. 252 In many cases, the health care
providers did not actually have telemedicine consultations with the
beneficiaries. 253
Unlike the pre-Public Health Emergency schemes, the health care providers
billed Medicare $1 million for telemedicine consultations.254 These claims were
false under the law because they “were obtained through kickbacks and bribes,
medically unnecessary, ineligible for reimbursement, and not provided as
represented.” 255 From April 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020, the Panda
laboratories billed Medicare more than $90 million for genetic tests procured
through kickbacks. 256 To conceal the scheme, Palatnik, Stein, and their coconspirators executed a sham contract that provided payments of $50,000 per
month from Panda to 1523 as “purported IT and consultation services.” 257 On
September 1, 2021, the DOJ announced that Leonel Palatnik pleaded guilty
to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and “offer kickbacks
and one count of paying a kickback” in violation of the AKS. 258 On November
9, 2021, Palatnik was sentenced to eighty-two months in prison and ordered
to pay over $61 million in restitution. 259

251. Id.
252. Id. at 10–12. The indictment explains that the health care providers who ordered the
testing were required to certify that “I am the patient’s treating physician and this order is based
upon Medicare’s requirement that the testing is not ordered for the purpose of screening but for
the diagnosis and treatment of the patient’s individual medical condition.” Id. Medicare does not
cover diagnostic testing that “[was] not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment
of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(a)(1)(A). Even if the diagnostic testing was necessary for the treatment of an illness,
Medicare required that all “diagnostic laboratory tests . . . must be ordered by the physician who
is treating the beneficiary, that is, the physician who furnishes a consultation or treats a
beneficiary for a specific medical problem . . . . Tests not ordered by the physician who is treating
the beneficiary are not reasonable and necessary.” 42 C.F.R. § 410.32(a) (2022).
253. Indictment, supra note 245, at 11.
254. Id. at 12.
255. Id.; see supra Section II.A.
256. Agreed Factual Basis for Guilty Plea, supra note 248, at 3.
257. Id. at 2.
258. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 246.
259. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Laboratory Owner Sentenced to 82 Months in Prison
for COVID-19 Kickback Scheme (Nov. 9, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/laboratoryowner-sentenced-82-months-prison-covid-19-kickback-scheme [https://perma.cc/E8XC-FE3R];
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
OCTOBER 1, 2021–MARCH 31, 2022, at 13 (2022), https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publication
s/archives/semiannual/2022/2022-spring-sar.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH7G-HPZB].
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In the pre-Public Health Emergency telemedicine schemes, the health
care provider’s ability to prescribe or order DME and laboratory tests via
telemedicine facilitated the fraudulent conduct. In most of the cases,
however, the telemedicine providers never billed for their consultations
with the Medicare beneficiaries. The fraudsters probably believed that by not
billing for the telemedicine consultations, they reduced their chance of
getting caught since the telemedicine visits (to the extent they took place)
were not in compliance with the strict reimbursement rules. Specifically, it is
unlikely that the telemedicine visits complied with the geographic restrictions
or originating site requirements and many of the consultations may have
happened by phone which was not reimbursable prior to the Public Health
Emergency. Telemedicine is only important in these billing schemes
because the use of technology substantially increased the number of
beneficiaries who could be drawn into the fraudulent billing in a short
amount of time. Indeed, the billing scheme of sending unnecessary DME
equipment to Medicare beneficiaries has been around for a long time. 260
In the one scam that took place during the Public Health Emergency,
however, the providers billed for the telemedicine consultations. The Public
Health Emergency waivers removed the restrictions on reimbursement for
telemedicine visits. Thus, the fraudsters were probably not concerned that
submitting claims for the telemedicine consultations would reveal the fraud
to the Government. Given the Public Health Emergency waivers, future
telemedicine schemes will probably turn on the reimbursement rules in addition
to or instead of kickbacks and the provision of unnecessary services.
B. EXPLAINING TELEMEDICINE SCAMS THROUGH THE FRAUD TRIANGLE
There are innumerable factors that could motivate someone to engage
in health care fraud. Most of the people who commit fraud, whether in the
health care context or otherwise, are not career criminals. 261 Largely, the
people who commit fraud are trusted employees. Some people commit whitecollar crimes to maintain their social status. But it is particularly difficult to
understand why someone engages in fraud when someone similarly situated

260. OFF. OF I NSPECTOR GEN., supra note 139. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Fed. Bureau
of Investigation, Owner of Durable Medical Equipment Company and Two Others Convicted in
$11 Million Health Care Fraud Scheme (Feb. 21, 2013), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/san
antonio/press-releases/2013/owner-of-durable-medical-equipment-company-and-two-othersconvicted-in-11-million-health-care-fraud-scheme [https://perma.cc/8ZPV-L4FJ] (explaining that
the owners of the DME business admitted that they used marketers to obtain information about
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries that they used to fraudulently bill Medicare and Medicaid
for DME that was either never prescribed or was prescribed but never delivered and that they
attempted to obtain referrals from doctors in exchange for gifts).
261. See Joe McGrath, Why Do Good People Do Bad Things? A Multi-Level Analysis of Individual,
Organizational, and Structural Causes of White-Collar Crime, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525, 540–41
(2020) (“[Donald] Cressey’s work demonstrated that . . . those engaged in wrongdoing will often
be law abiding, as will their colleagues, but they rationalize or ‘neutralize’ their wrongdoing.”).
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does not. Perhaps the best way to explain the expected uptick in fraud in
telemedicine is through the frame of the Fraud Triangle. The Fraud Triangle
theory is used to describe why some individuals in positions of trust commit
occupational fraud.
The origins of the theory trace back to the 1950s when American
criminologist Donald Cressey developed a three-pronged theory to explain
why some people in positions of trust commit embezzlement while others do
not. 262 Under his theory, the three factors common to the embezzlers
were: (1) a non-shareable financial problem; 263 (2) an opportunity for
trust violation; 264 and (3) rationalization of the planned violation. 265 Cressey
believed that all three elements were required for someone to violate a
position of trust and commit embezzlement. 266 Although Cressey’s theory

262. Leandra Lederman, The Fraud Triangle and Tax Evasion, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1153, 1155
–57 (2021) (explaining that the theory originated from Cressey’s work on embezzlement).
Cressey explained:
Trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of themselves as having
a financial problem which is non-shareable, are aware that this problem can be
secretly resolved by violation of the position of financial trust, and are able to apply
to their conduct in that situation verbalizations which enable them to adjust
their conceptions of themselves . . . as users of the entrusted funds or property.
DONALD CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EMBEZZLEMENT
30 (Patterson Smith Publishing Corp. ed. 1973) (1953).
263. CRESSEY, supra note 262, at 30. Cressey referred to five general types of non-shareable
problems: (1) violation of ascribed obligations; (2) problems resulting from personal failure;
(3) problems resulting from business reversals (such as economic depression); (4) problems
related to status-gaining; and (5) problems resulting from employer-employee relations (such as
feeling underpaid or overworked). Id. at 33–76. Cressey emphasized, however, that “the . . . types
of non-shareable problems are not discrete.” Id. at 66. He explained that the common
denominator was that:
[B]ecause of activity prior to the defalcation, the approval of groups important to
the trusted person had been lost, or a distinct feeling that present group approval
would be lost if certain activity were revealed, with the result that the trusted person
was effectively isolated from persons who could assist him in solving problems arising
from that activity.
Id.
264. Id. at 30. In describing an opportunity for a trust violation, Cressey explained that “the
trust violator must have a certain amount of knowledge or information about trust violation in
general, and specifically he must be aware that the violation of his trust will aid in the solution of
the problem.” Id. at 91.
265. Id. at 30–34. Cressey explained that through rationalization, “the potential trust violator
identifies the possibilities for resolving the problem by violating his position of trust and defines
the relationship between the non-shareable problem and the illegal solution in language which
enables him to look upon trust violation (a) as essentially non-criminal” (borrowing the money
rather than stealing it), “(b) as justified, or (c) as a part of a general irresponsibility for which he
is not completely accountable.” Id. at 93.
266. Id. at 31 (“[T]he presence of a non-sharable financial problem will not in itself
guarantee that the behavior in question will follow. The entire process must be present.”). Cressey
explained “that the ideas inherent in these three types of expressions are not discrete and that
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faced some criticism, 267 the accounting community embraced the theory and
adapted it over time to explain occupational fraud. The three factors have
evolved over time and now include: (1) incentives or pressure to commit
fraud; (2) a perceived opportunity; and (3) rationalization of the act. 268
The first factor—incentives or pressure to commit fraud—is the motivation
for the crime. 269 It is generally understood to be financial in nature. The
individual may have a personal financial problem, such as credit card or
gambling debt, or a professional financial problem, such as an unattainable
sales goal, that she cannot solve through legitimate means. The inability to
solve the financial problem through legitimate means, leads the person to
consider fixing the problem through illegal means.
The second factor—perceived opportunity—is the individual’s belief that
she has the ability to override internal controls, meaning the measures the
company put in place to prevent or detect fraud. 270 Thus, the individual
believes that she can use her position of trust to capture the incentive or
solve her financial problem without being caught. The third factor—
rationalization of the act—is how the individual, who does not consider
herself to be a criminal, justifies the crime. 271 Thus, the individual may say
that she committed a victimless crime or that she was entitled to the money
due to mistreatment by the employer.
As Professor Leandra Lederman has explained:
Generally speaking, the triangle’s first two factors—incentive or
pressure and perceived opportunity—may be thought of as in line
with the deterrence model, while the third factor—rationalization—
accords with behavioral theories of compliance. While increasing
compliance norms may help limit convenient rationalizations for
cheating (and likely more so than good-government measures)
structural systems constrain the opportunity to evade. In addition,
enforcement actions reduce the incentive and opportunity to
cheat, while buttressing compliance norms. The fraud triangle thus
provides a useful frame for showing how traditional economic and
behavioral theories can work together. 272
In telemedicine, the financial incentive to engage in fraud is tremendous.
Through telemedicine, providers can justify a greater volume of billing for
the theory which we are presenting is in reference to a process[,] the result of which is a trust
violation.” Id. at 34.
267. Lederman, supra note 262, at 1158–66 (summarizing the methodology of Cressey’s
study and the common critiques of his work).
268. Id. at 1156–57 (tracing the evolution of the theory and noting that the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) adopted these standards in the early 2000s).
269. Id. at 1159–61.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1207.
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products and services because in-person consultations are unnecessary. 273
They use telemarketers to target thousands of Medicare patients and submit
reimbursements, and prior to the Public Health Emergency, fraudsters used
telemedicine to further their DME or laboratory testing schemes. 274 With the
Public Health Emergency waivers, however, individuals stand to gain millions
from sham telemedicine visits in addition to their DME or laboratory testing
schemes. In terms of perceived pressure, individuals could be living beyond
their means, have large expenses or personal debt, or have a gambling or drug
addiction.
With respect to opportunity, individuals may believe that the control on
Medicare and other payment systems is ineffective. Thus, they believe that the
chance of getting caught is low. 275 Historically, there has been a low chance
of getting caught prior to payment because OIG relied on a pay-and-chase
model of fraud enforcement. 276 The chance of getting caught prior to
payment has increased with the use of data analytics but individuals
considering fraud may not accurately perceive that shift. Individuals may also
think that they have a great chance of getting away with telemedicine fraud
because it is not on the Government’s radar. Prior to 2019, there had not
been any DOJ press releases announcing charges in telemedicine cases. 277
Since that time, there have been several announcements of indictments which
indicate that telemedicine fraud has been on the DOJ’s radar since 2016 if
not earlier. 278 Despite the uptick in enforcement, the expansion of access to
telemedicine during the pandemic combined with the relaxation of HIPAA
and shared payment rules (aimed at preventing fraud), may convince
individuals that they have a new or greater opportunity to commit
telemedicine fraud without getting caught. They may wrongly believe that the
pandemic will distract the Government from focusing on enforcement activities.
Telemedicine fraudsters may seek to rationalize their conduct by
claiming that they are committing a victimless crime. 279 Because health care
providers, telemedicine companies, and suppliers that commit this type of
fraud do not have pre-existing relationships with Medicare beneficiaries, it is
easier to see this as a victimless crime. 280 In justifying their behavior,
fraudsters do not consider that taking public funds for private gain takes the
funds away from essential services. They do not consider the faceless
government a victim. Nor do they consider the impact on beneficiaries who
may be billed for services that they did not request or face annual or lifetime
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.
See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 12.
Lederman, supra note 262, at 1159–61.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 12.
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limits on coverage due to fraudulent claims for services that they did not
request and/or receive.
The change in telemedicine rules during the Public Health Emergency
and the likelihood that some or all of the waivers will remain in place after
the Public Health Emergency ends has created the perfect storm for fraud
to flourish. Individuals will perceive a greater incentive to commit
telemedicine fraud because more money is potentially at stake due to the
expansion of access to telemedicine services. They may also believe that
they have a greater opportunity to commit fraud because they perceive a low
possibility of getting caught due to lax enforcement. Finally, they likely do
not believe that their fraudulent activity hurts anyone.
Although telemedicine has been critical to increase access to care during
the pandemic, the billions of dollars involved in these telemedicine scams
demonstrate that telemedicine poses serious program integrity risks. These
large-scale frauds will increase the volume of telemedicine visits which will likely
lead to increased costs. In addition, they expose both inappropriate telemedicine
practices and financial relationships between providers. This fraud threatens
the funds available for legitimate medical needs. It is crucial that these risks
be addressed prior to the permanent expansion of telemedicine. The Fraud
Triangle will help in assessing whether potential regulations of telemedicine
will both prevent fraud and preserve access to care.
IV. BALANCING FRAUD PREVENTION WITH ACCESS TO CARE
The goals of telemedicine are diametrically opposed to the goals of
rooting out health care fraud. Telemedicine is clearly aimed at increasing
access to health care services. And, as Professor Dayna Bowen Matthew has
stated, “[c]ost containment, not universal access, is the objective of the war
on health[]care fraud.” 281 Access to health care is a critical issue in the United
States. As of 2021, there are more than six-thousand primary care Health
Professional Shortage Areas.282 Rural, economically depressed, and underserved
areas face health care provider shortages and have some of the greatest health
care needs. 283 Further, “rural residents or urban residents in health[]care
281. Dayna Bowen Matthew, An Economic Model to Analyze the Impact of False Claims Act Cases on
Access to Healthcare for the Elderly, Disabled, Rural and Inner-City Poor, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 439, 440
(2001).
282. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., HEALTH WORKFORCE STRATEGIC PLAN 2021, at 12
(2021), https://bhw.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/bureau-health-workforce/about-us/hhs-hea
lth-workforce-strategic-plan-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG24-BGVV].
283. Id.
For example, rural residents tend to have lower life expectancy levels than their
urban counterparts, and the per capita availability of primary care physicians to serve
rural residents is roughly 19 percent lower than in urban areas. Economically depressed
and other underserved areas also face greater challenges in recruiting and retaining
health care providers. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these challenges.
Americans in underserved areas may be at higher risk of severe illness from COVID-
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access ‘deserts’ often must travel long distances to access clinical specialists.” 284
When access to care is unavailable, it can lead to poor health outcomes.
In crafting policies to prevent health care fraud in telemedicine, we
must balance “access to essential health care services” “while ensuring taxpayer
dollars are not lost to fraud, waste, and abuse.” 285 While it is not year clear
what restrictions may end up applying to reimbursement for telemedicine
services, telemedicine is here to stay. As such, we must consider the best way
to maintain program integrity in this transformed health care delivery landscape.
The large-scale telemedicine scams discussed in the previous Part largely
involve kickbacks and billing for medically unnecessary treatment, services, or
supplies, and the criminal conduct in those schemes falls squarely in the
purview of the AKS and FCA. 286 Thus, once the fraudulent schemes are
identified through either data analytics or whistleblower complaints and
investigated, the existing health care fraud and abuse laws are sufficiently
capacious to address the criminality involved. Therefore, the challenge is
not creating a new criminal statute to deal with a unique enforcement
problem. Instead, we must find ways to prevent or identify these telemedicine
scams prior to payment and the resultant loss to the Government. The best
way to ensure program integrity is to prevent fraud before it occurs. It is less
expensive to prevent fraud than to detect, investigate, and prosecute it.
This Part will examine preventative measures that the Government could
implement to address the problem of telemedicine fraud. It will scrutinize
potential limitations on the use of telemedicine, such as prohibiting
reimbursement for DME, prescriptions, or laboratory tests in the absence of
a pre-existing doctor-patient relationship and limiting reimbursement to
providers participating in certain value-based reimbursement plans. It will
also assess the use of the Medicare enrollment and reimbursement process
to prevent or identify fraudulent activity. This Part concludes that the
Government should employ an approach that limits the opportunity to commit
fraud and maximizes access to care through telemedicine. Ideally, such an
approach should be put into place prior to permanent waiver of any of the
pre–Public Health Emergency restrictions on telemedicine.
A. PRIOR DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
Perhaps the most difficult issue to resolve in crafting anti-fraud regulations
for telemedicine is whether to require a pre-existing doctor-patient relationship
prior to treatment. According to the American Medical Association, “[a] patient19, rural health care infrastructure is limited, and rural residents or urban residents
in health[]care access “deserts” often must travel long distances to access clinical
specialists.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
284. Id.
285. Id.; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 180, at 1.
286. See supra Section II.A.
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physician relationship exists when a physician serves a patient’s medical needs.
Generally, the relationship is entered into by mutual consent between physician
and patient (or surrogate).”287 More specifically, “a patient-physician
relationship is generally formed when a physician affirmatively acts in a
patient’s case by examining, diagnosing, treating, or agreeing to do so.” 288
There is no question that telemedicine visits can be helpful to reinforce the
doctor-patient relationship because in many situations patients would
prefer to have a telemedicine appointment with their regular doctor rather
than traveling to urgent care or the emergency room where they would
encounter a doctor with whom they have no prior relationship. Thus,
telemedicine appointments can further continuity of care. The key
question, however, is whether that pre-existing relationship can be
established through a telemedicine visit. This dilemma, more than any
other, illustrates how the best measures to eliminate health care fraud can
fly in the face of the goals of telemedicine.
One of the key reasons that the large-scale fraudulent schemes are
successful is because telemarketers can call people with whom they have no
prior association, initiate sham telemedicine visits, and direct them to get tests
at certain labs, prescriptions from certain pharmacies, or equipment from
particular DME providers and then their partner labs, pharmacies, and DME
providers bill Medicare. The easiest way to stop this type of fraud is to require
a prior doctor-patient relationship with the doctor requesting laboratory tests
or writing prescriptions for drugs or DME. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic,
the American Medical Association’s position was that “[a] patient-physician
relationship should ideally be established before the provision of services via
telehealth.” 289 If a prior doctor-patient relationship is required, the Medicare

287. Patient-Physician Relationships: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 1.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N, https:
//www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/patient-physician-relationships [https://perma.cc
/DJ8D-CPBY].
288. Valarie Blake, When Is a Patient-Physician Relationship Established?, 14 AM. MED. ASS’N J.
ETHICS 403, 404 (2012) (citing case law to establish that the relationship begins once the physician
has agreed to treat the patient).
289. ADVOC. RES. CTR., AM. MED. ASS’N, ISSUE BRIEF: STATE TELEHEALTH POLICIES TO ENSURE
ACCESS TO HIGH-QUALITY CARE 2 (2021), https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/202012/issue
-brief-state-telehealth-policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KB5-VC76]. This relationship can
be established . . . through: (i) A face-to-face examination, if a face-to-face encounter
would otherwise be required in the provision of the same service not delivered via
telemedicine; or (ii) A consultation with another physician who has an ongoing
patient-physician relationship with the patient. The physician who has established a
valid physician-patient relationship must agree to supervise the patient’s care; or (iii)
Meeting standards of establishing a patient-physician relationship included as part of
evidence-based clinical practice guidelines on telemedicine developed by major
medical specialty societies, such as those of radiology and pathology. Exceptions
include on-call, cross coverage situations; emergency medical treatment; and other
exceptions that become recognized as meeting or improving the standard of care.
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Administrative Contractors, that process Medicare Part A/B medical and
DME claims, could utilize data analytics to sift through prior claims data and
detect that the patient had no prior relationship with the doctor. 290 Thus, the
Medicare Administrative Contractors would be able to detect the sham claims
before paying them.
There is no question, however, that requiring a pre-existing doctorpatient relationship would run counter to the goal of making doctors more
accessible, especially to people in rural or underserved areas. It would also
harm patients, such as those seeking medication abortion, whose first encounter
with the doctor would likely be at the time the patient is seeking the
medication. 291 The potential harm to patients would increase if there were
also a requirement that the doctor-patient relationship be established during
a face-to-face encounter prior to a telemedicine visit. For example, patients
may have a difficult time traveling to meet the doctor if they do not own a
car or cannot afford transportation to the doctor’s office. In addition, this
may cause patients to delay care which could further worsen their medical
conditions. The doctor-patient relationship is built on trust and a commitment
of care between the doctor and the patient. There is nothing inherent about
a telemedicine visit that would make it unable to fulfill the AMA’s or an
individual state’s requirements for a doctor-patient relationship. Indeed, all
states allow doctors and patients to establish a new doctor-patient relationship
through telemedicine. 292
ADVOC. RES. CTR., AM. MED. ASS’N, 50-STATE SURVEY: ESTABLISHMENT OF A PATIENT-PHYSICIAN
RELATIONSHIP VIA TELEMEDICINE 1 (2018), https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2018-10/amachart-telemedicine-patient-physician-relationship.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3BA-MX48].
290. “The Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs) shall analyze claims to determine
provider compliance with Medicare coverage, coding, and billing rules and take appropriate
corrective action when providers are found to be non-compliant. . . . The priority for MACs is to
minimize potential future losses to the Medicare Trust Funds through targeted claims review
while using resources efficiently and treating providers and beneficiaries fairly.” CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PROGRAM I NTEGRITY MANUAL, ch. 3, § 3.1 (2021),
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/pim83c03.
pdf [https://perma.cc/24KE-JFGX].
291. See Amrutha Ramaswamy, Gabriela Weigel, Laurie Sobel & Alina Salganicoff, Medication
Abortion and Telemedicine: Innovations and Barriers During the COVID-19 Emergency, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (June 16, 2021), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/medication-abortion-telemedicineinnovations-and-barriers-during-the-covid-19-emergency [https://perma.cc/X5VZ-JSXT].
“Medication abortion, also known as medical abortion or abortion with pills, is a pregnancy
termination protocol that involves taking two different drugs, Mifepristone and Misoprostol, that
can be safely used up to the first 70 days (10 weeks) of pregnancy.” The Availability and Use of
Medication Abortion, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 6, 2022), https://www.kff.org/womens-healthpolicy/fact-sheet/the-availability-and-use-of-medication-abortion [https://perma.cc/S5EA-XD5Y].
Mifepristone is not available at retail pharmacies. Id. It can only be obtained directly from a
certified medical provider because the FDA requires a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy to
ensure the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks. Id. Telemedicine could help to expand access
to medication abortion, but many states have taken action to block the use of telemedicine for
abortion. Id.
292. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
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Not surprisingly, the American Telemedicine Association (“ATA”) is
opposed to requiring prior in-person consults for telemedicine visits. 293
The ATA argues that “[t]here is no clinical evidence for an arbitrary inperson requirement before a patient can access telehealth services.” 294
Citing the Federation of State Medical Boards, 295 the ATA maintains that a
doctor/patient relationship can be established via a telemedicine visit. 296
Indeed, the Federation of State Medical Boards explains, “[w]here an
existing physician-patient relationship is not present, a physician must take
appropriate steps to establish a physician-patient relationship[,] . . . and . . . such
physician-patient relationships may be established using telemedicine
technologies provided the standard of care is met.” 297 Similarly, the American
Medical Association now argues that there should be some flexibility in
how the doctor-patient relationship is established. The American Medical
Association states, “for new patients, a relationship can be established via
telehealth if it meets the standard of care, including via real-time
audio/video.” 298
293. AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, PROGRAM INTEGRITY OVERVIEW 2 (2021), https://www.ameri
cantelemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/ATA-Program-Integrity-One-Pager-3-1-21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KBD-X9U7] (“The ATA would consider additional guardrails for telehealth,
specifically as proposed by the OIG, that do not require prior in-person consults, limit access to
any modality including audio-only, or otherwise create barriers to patients seeking legitimate and
needed care.”).
294. AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, OVERVIEW OF THE IN-PERSON REQUIREMENTS 1, https://
www.americantelemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ATA-Overview-of-In-Person-Require
ments-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJ63-26XG] (discussing the requirement of an in-person visit
six months prior to a Medicare-reimbursed mental health telemedicine visit in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 116-260, div. CC, tit. I, subtit. B, § 123, 134 Stat. 1182, 2956–57
(2020) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(m)(7) (2020))).
295. The Federation of State Medical Boards (“FSMB”) serves as the primary center for
collection, maintenance, and reporting of disciplinary actions taken against physicians by its
member boards and other governmental authorities. About FSMB, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS.
(2018), https://www.fsmb.org/about-fsmb [https://perma.cc/REV8-JVTE]. Disciplinary actions
are reported to the FSMB by state licensing and disciplinary boards, Canadian licensing
authorities, the U.S. armed forces, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the
Education Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates. See id.
FSMB’s membership is composed of the medical boards of all states, the District of
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, and includes separate osteopathic boards
in the United States. Membership Information, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. (2018), https://www
.fsmb.org/about-fsmb/fsmb-member-medical-boards [https://perma.cc/ELU6-C69C].
296. See generally AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, supra note 294 (discussing in person requirements
of establishing the physician-patient relationship).
297. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., MODEL POLICY FOR THE APPROPRIATE USE OF T ELEMEDICINE
TECHNOLOGIES IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 5 (2014), https://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_docu
ments.asp?session=29&docid=63635 [https://perma.cc/LG8K-PR7C].
298. ADVOC. RES. CTR., supra note 289, at 2. It should be noted, however, that prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the AMA’s position was that a doctor-patient relationship must be established
via a face-to-face encounter prior to the provision of telemedicine services. Coverage of and Payment
for Telemedicine H-480.946, AM. MED. ASS’N (2022), https://policysearch.ama-assn.org/policyfind
er/detail/telemedicine?uri=%2FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-0-4347.xml [https://perma.cc/3DJE-A5W5].
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Even if we permit the establishment of the doctor-patient relationship via
telemedicine, that is not the end of the inquiry. The question becomes
whether, for purposes of fraud prevention, different rules should apply
when a health care provider is ordering laboratory tests or prescribing
medication or DME via telemedicine. In its March 2021 report to Congress,
the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission recommended that clinicians
be required to provide a face-to-face, in-person visit on the date that the
clinician “order[s] a high-cost DME product or a high cost lab test for that
beneficiary or within six months before such date.” 299 The Medicare Payment
Advisory Committee explained that this “would help ensure that a beneficiary
needs a product or test based on a needs assessment conducted by a clinician
before Medicare pays for it.” 300
If health care fraud were the sole concern, then it would be easy to make
the case that there should be a pre-existing doctor-patient relationship that
was established during a face-to-face interaction before the provision of
telemedicine services where a doctor prescribes drugs or DME or orders a
laboratory test. Such a rule could potentially eliminate the large-scale scams.
In terms of the fraud triangle, this rule would not lessen the perceived
pressure that motivates the misconduct whether that pressure be personal,
employment stress, or external. It would, however, lessen the opportunity to
commit fraud and greatly increase the likelihood of detection through data
analytics. The imposition of in-person visits would also make it more difficult
for a provider to rationalize the misconduct by telling herself that the crime
is victimless. The provider would no longer be defrauding faceless people
with whom she has no prior association.
But health care fraud is not the only concern here. There must be a
balancing of interests between fraud prevention and access to care. Access to
care is hurt by a rule that requires an in-person visit prior to the prescription
or ordering of drugs, DME, and laboratory tests. Beneficiaries in underserved
communities may not be able to obtain needed DME or laboratory tests as a
result of this rule. They may be incapable of establishing a doctor-patient
relationship in person due to the shortage of providers where they live and
the need to travel long distances for appointments. Studies have shown that the
use of telemedicine during the COVID-19 pandemic was effective at reducing
disparities in care. 301 It would be short-sighted to take actions that would undo
those needed gains. Until we do more to recruit and train health professionals
in rural and underserved areas, rules that limit access to care for the purpose
of ending fraud may do more harm than good. Lawmakers need to think
carefully about these types of limitations and whether it makes sense to carve
out an exception to the limitation for rural and underserved areas.

299.
300.
301.

2021 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 470–71.
Id.
See supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text.
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B. LIMITING REIMBURSEMENT BASED ON HEALTH CARE PAYMENT MODEL
One avenue to address fraud may include limiting reimbursement for
telemedicine visits to providers who have embraced alternative billing
arrangements. In the U.S. health care system, most insurers (both public and
private) pay health care providers on a fee-for-service basis. 302 Thus, doctors,
hospitals, and other health care providers bill separately for each service
provided to a patient regardless of patient outcome. 303 Fee-for-service billing
encourages over-utilization and disincentivizes efficient care models “because
. . . profits . . . increase consistently with greater quantities” of provided services.304
Similarly, profits increase from more costly services. 305 As a result, “some
patients get too much care, some do not get enough, and others get the wrong
care.” 306 Fee-for-service billing also drives up health care costs due to lack
of transparency concerning the cost of health care, lack of accountability
for patient outcomes, and the administrative burden on the health care
system. 307
Public policy makers have worked to shift incentives by focusing on valuebased reimbursement, which puts the focus on quality of care rather than
quantity of care. 308 Under value-based models, providers seek relationships
with other providers and organizations to provide continuity of care. 309 Thus,
payments are based on health outcomes and cost reductions. The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”) created the
Medicare Shared Savings Program, which permits providers to receive fee-for-

302. Dale B. Thompson, The Next Stage of Health Care Reform: Controlling Costs by Paying Health
Plans Based on Health Outcomes, 44 AKRON L. REV. 727, 729–30 (2011); Cody Vitello, Transforming
the Way We Pay Doctors, 19 ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 34, 38–39 (2009).
303. See Thompson, supra note 302, at 729–30; Vitello, supra note 302, at 38–39.
304. Thompson, supra note 302, at 730.
305. Id.
306. KAITLIN HUNTER, DAVID KENDALL & LADAN AHMADI, THIRD WAY, THE CASE AGAINST FEEFOR-SERVICE HEALTH CARE 5 (2021), http://thirdway.imgix.net/pdfs/the-case-against-fee-for-ser
vice-health-care.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QLK-WQV6].
307. Id. at 7–8.
308. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., R EPORT TO CONGRESS: FRAUD AND A BUSE
LAWS REGARDING GAINSHARING OR SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HOSPITALS
AS REQUIRED BY S ECTION 512( B) OF THE M EDICARE A CCESS AND CHIP R EAUTHORIZATION A CT
OF 2015, at 7 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS], https://www.cms.gov/Medicare
/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/Downloads/Report-to-Congress-2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZR4A-3287].
309. As OIG has observed, however, “arrangements . . . that improve or maintain quality of
care, reduce waste, and/or increase efficiency, may implicate the Federal fraud and abuse laws.”
Id. Thus, “the fraud and abuse laws may serve as an impediment to robust, innovative programs
that align providers by using financial incentives to achieve quality standards, generate cost
savings, and reduce waste.” Id. As a result, CMS and OIG have waived the requirements of AKS
and other fraud laws to carry out the shared savings program. Id. at 7–8. In 2021, CMS
implemented a final rule providing safe harbors for value-based reimbursement models. See
supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text.
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service payments and be eligible for additional reimbursements if they meet
quality and cost saving benchmarks. 310 The Affordable Care Act also established
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, which tests alternative
payment models (“APMs”). 311 APMs use “a payment approach that gives added
incentive payments to provide high-quality and cost-efficient care.” 312 Some
examples of APMs are Accountable Care Organizations, 313 Patient-Centered
Medical Homes, and new programs that bundle payments for episodes of
care. 314 Providers can participate in more than one APM, and each APM can
have different tracks that expose the provider to various levels of risk. 315 APMs
may focus on particular provider types, geographic locations, populations,
clinical condition, or care episodes. 316

310. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119,
395–99 (2010).
311. Id. § 3021, 124 Stat. 119, 389–95; QUALITY PAYMENT PROGRAM, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., APMS OVERVIEW, https://qpp.cms.gov/apms/overview [https://perma.cc/JB
34-R785].
312. QUALITY PAYMENT PROGRAM, supra note 311.
313. An Accountable Care Organization is “a group of doctors, hospitals, and other health
care providers, who come together voluntarily in an effort to give coordinated, high-quality care
to the patients they serve.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-22-104618, MEDICARE:
INFORMATION ON THE TRANSITION TO ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT MODELS BY PROVIDERS IN RURAL,
HEALTH PROFESSIONAL SHORTAGE, OR UNDERSERVED AREAS 1 (2021) [hereinafter GAO APM
TRANSITION REPORT], https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104618.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2
QU-39VS].
314. Kenya Woodruff & Neil Issar, A Balancing Act: Alternative Payment Models and Physician
Compensation, 30 HEALTH L., 10, 10 (2017).
315. GAO APM TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 313, at 6.
Some tracks may include one-sided risk where the participating providers may share
in the savings that are generated from lowering health care costs but assume no
financial risk. Other tracks may have two-sided risk models where participants can
share in savings and may receive added incentive payments, but also take on
increasing levels of financial risk.
Id.
316.

Id.
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The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015,317 established
the Quality Payment Program for clinicians. 318 The Quality Payment Program
recognizes the role of APMs in furthering CMS’s goal to move from fee-forservice to reimbursement models that focus on the quality of care. Beginning
in 2019, clinicians who participate in qualified advanced alternative
payment models (“A-APMs”) receive an incentive payment of five percent
of their professional services payments. 319 A-APMs are a CMS-approved subset
of APMs where APM entities invest more deeply in value-based care and
assume greater revenue risks and rewards. A-APMs must meet three criteria:
(1) Participants must use certified electronic health record technology 320;
(2) payments must be based on quality measures 321; and (3) either the A-APM
bears a significant financial risk or is a Medical Home Model 322 expanded
under CMS Innovation Center authority.323 “Most other clinicians participate in
the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) and receive a positive or
negative payment adjustment (or no change) based on their performance in
four areas: quality, resource use, advancing care information (formerly

317. See generally Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 11410, 129 Stat. 87 (2015) (providing the Quality Payment Program). The Medicare Access and
CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 repealed the Medicare Sustainable Growth Rate (“SGR”)
formula for calculating physician payments. Id. § 101, 129 Stat. 87, 89–128.
The SGR . . . was the product of a congressional effort to constrain growth in
Medicare’s spending on physician services. The underlying formula was meant
to generate reductions in fee-for-service payment rates when Medicare’s total
spending on physicians’ services grew more quickly than a target growth rate. It
made allowances for modest fee increases, changes in the number of Medicare
beneficiaries, and GDP growth, among other factors.
Jeffrey Clemens & Stan Veuger, Repeal of the Medicare Sustainable Growth Rate: Direct and Indirect
Consequences, 17 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 1053, 1053 (2015). Because actual expenditures grew
faster than target expenditures, the Medicare SGR formula reduced Medicare’s fee-for-service
payment rates. Id. Congress was under substantial political pressure from physician organizations
over the lowered payment rates and “enact[ed] a series of temporary measures to keep these cuts
from materializing.” Id. The temporary measures required annual or more frequent renewal and
over time the gap between the Medicare SGR calculated payment and the temporary measures
approached thirty percent. Id. at 1053–54.
318. Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, § 101, 129
Stat. 87, 89–128 (2015). The law requires most physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners,
clinical nurse specialists, and certified registered nurse anesthetist to participate in the Quality
Payment Program through either the Merit-based Incentive Payment System or an Advanced
APM. Id.
319. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 54, at 3.
320. 42 C.F.R. § 414.1415(a)(1) (2022).
321. Id. § 414.1415(b).
322. Id. § 414.1415(c); GAO APM TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 313, at 7 n.21 (“A Medical
Home Model is an approach to providing comprehensive primary care that facilitates
partnerships between patients, clinicians, medical staff, and families. It is a medical practice
organized to produce higher quality care and improved cost efficiency.”).
323. QUALITY PAYMENT PROGRAM, supra note 311.
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meaningful use of electronic health records), and clinical practice
improvement.” 324
The Medicare Payment Advisory Ie is considering which Medicare changes
to telemedicine coverage during the Public Health Emergency should be made
permanent. Although the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee recommends
that after the Public Health Emergency ends “Medicare should temporarily
pay for specified telehealth services provided to all beneficiaries regardless of
their location,” 325 they also discuss the possibility of granting broad telemedicine
waivers to clinicians in A-APMs. 326 Thus, it is possible that patients in A-APMs
could have greater access to telemedicine than those with providers who do
not participate in A-APMs. Ostensibly, this would promote value-based care
without undermining critical fraud and abuse laws, such as AKS, used to
police fee-for-service payments. If a provider is participating in A-APMs, then
they are less reliant on fee-for-service billing and will not be incentivized to
drive up costs.
There are some problems with this approach. In 2019, only twelve
percent of providers in rural, shortage, or underserved areas and only
fifteen percent of providers not located in these areas participated in AAPMs. 327 Unfortunately, switching to A-APMs is not just a matter of changing
payment options. Providers face a number of challenges in transitioning to AAPMs. Many providers lack the financial resources necessary to finance the
upfront costs associated with APMs and A-APMs. 328 Other providers are
averse to the financial risk involved in A-APMs or do not have the cash
reserves necessary to cover potential losses. 329 Some providers do not have
enough Medicare patients to warrant the required investment for APMs. 330

324. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 54, at 3.
325. 2021 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 8, at 458, 463. The temporary continuation
should last for one to two years after the end of the Public Health Emergency during which time
Medicare can gather more evidence about the impact on “access, quality, and cost” before making any
permanent changes. Id. at 458.
326. Id. at 463–64.
327. GAO APM TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 313, at 10.
328. Id. at 16. “[The] upfront costs associated with APM participation may include hiring
additional staff, developing new care management strategies, and performing analysis to estimate
the provider’s likely performance in an APM before joining one . . . .” Id. at 17.
329. Id. at 16. “If providers do not meet certain benchmarks in an Advanced APM, CMS
withholds or reduces payment, or providers owe payments to CMS. As such, providers with fewer
financial reserves may have a limited ability to participate in APMs that include such downside
risks.” Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
330. Id. at 16. “Additionally, providers who have lower patient volumes could face less predictable
spending and utilization patterns and heightened financial risk in an APM . . . .” Id. at 18. It may
also be difficult to control the cost of care because providers in these areas often must refer
patients to other providers for tertiary care (specialized diagnostic and treatment procedures).
Id. “Providers in rural, shortage, or underserved areas may not be part of a health system that
includes specialists and sometimes must refer patients to another practice to receive specialized
care, which can result in costs beyond their control . . . .” Id.
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Another barrier for providers concerns electronic health records. Some
providers cannot afford the costs associated with electronic health records or
do not have the high-speed internet necessary for electronic health records. 331
Other providers are unable to perform the data analytics and financial
modeling that is necessary to provide value-based care. 332 Another concern
for providers is that many of them do not have staff members who can manage
the transition to APMs and others do not have enough awareness about
APMs. 333 Finally, the design and availability of models can act as an
impediment to providers transitioning to APMs. Some providers have limited
APM options because of the restrictions on the models such as geographic or
participant limitations that make it difficult to find a model appropriate in
rural, shortage, or underserved communities. 334 With all of these barriers to
entry, it is clear that limiting reimbursement for telemedicine services to
providers in A-APMs would drastically reduce access to care. The reduction in
telemedicine services will be particularly acute in rural and underserved areas.
In terms of the fraud triangle, the use of A-APMs as a limiting principle
for telemedicine reimbursement may have no effect on the pressure to
commit fraud for some and may increase the pressure on others. A-APMs
require providers to take on financial risk based on the quality of the care
they provide. Some practitioners may view the value-based payment models as
a threat to their livelihood because they will lose the certainty that comes from
being paid based on the services they provide. Providers with struggling
practices may be more tempted to falsify data to earn incentives or prevent
a reduction in payment.
Further, the use of A-APMs changes rather than eliminates the
opportunity to commit fraud. The use of A-APMs may reduce the type of fraud
discussed in this Article by making it less profitable to write unnecessary
prescriptions or orders. If payment is based on care outcome, then
unnecessary tests, DME, or drugs increases the cost of care without any
corresponding benefit for the care outcome. With respect to the scale of the
fraud, there may be mixed results in terms of opportunity. On the one hand,
if reimbursement for telemedicine is limited to A-APMs then the universe
331. Id. at 16. Certified Electronic Health Record technology is required for A-APMs. Id. at
19. Reportedly, “[Electronic Health Record] vendors charge practices the same price regardless
of their size . . . [and] vendors charge practices every time they interface their system with another
practice’s [Electronic Health Records], and these charges can range in the thousands of dollars.”
Id.
332. Id. at 16. Both financial modeling and data analysis are needed “to assess performance
in an APM.” Id. at 18. Many providers in rural, shortage, or underserved areas would have to
contract with outside firms to conduct the financial modeling and data analysis. Id. at 18–19.
333. Id. at 16. “[E]xisting staff in small practices in rural, shortage, or underserved areas may
already be overburdened with office administration duties,” which requires new staff to handle
care coordination and data processing. Id. at 20. These practices simply do not have the
infrastructure that larger practices have that would allow them to participate in A-APMs. Id.
334. Id. at 16.
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of beneficiaries that could be taken advantage of through these schemes is
much smaller because such a minute percentage of providers use A-APMs. On
the other hand, prior to the expansion of access to telemedicine beyond rural
and underserved areas, providers engaged in large scale fraud and attempted
to avoid detection by not billing for the telemedicine visit. Utilizing the AAPM payment model would not remove that opportunity.
It is also important to recognize that value-based reimbursement programs
carry
inherent risks of fraud because of the high stakes involved. That is,
as [value-based purchasing] either rewards or penalizes providers
depending on performance, and subsequent performance results
are posted to public information sites, there is substantial financial
and reputational value at stake if quality data does not meet the
mark. 335
The accuracy of data is a serious concern in value-based reimbursement. 336
Thus, a provider might falsely certify that it has achieved certain quality
metrics that are necessary to obtain incentive payments. 337 That false
certification could lead to liability under the FCA. 338 Further, there may be
situations where billed services were not received by Medicare beneficiaries
even though quality criteria or outcomes were recorded in the medical
record.339 In those situations, the “[data quality] would be compromised and
the scores submitted for [value-based purchasing] purposes would be false
or fraudulent.” 340 Inevitably, those determined to commit fraud will find ways
to manipulate claims and care data to maximize reimbursements from the
Federal Government. Thus, shifting to A-APMs may reduce fraud based on
overutilization or lack of medical necessity but it is not a silver bullet.
Finally, the use of A-APMs may only have a minimal impact on the ability
to rationalize telemedicine fraud. 341 One of the goals of value-based
reimbursement is to get providers more invested in care outcomes. 342 To the
extent that providers become more concerned about the care outcomes of

335. PollyBeth Hawk, Ready or Not: Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Poised to Transform
Healthcare Reimbursement Model and Introduce New Fraud Targets Under the False Claims Act, 22 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 43, 58 (2013).
336. Id. at 58–64 (explaining how the Government utilizes data mining and auditing to test
the quality of data).
337. Anna M. Grizzle, Amy Sanders Morgan & Brian D. Roark, New Wine in Old Wineskins:
Mitigating Fraud and Abuse Risks in Value-Based Reimbursement, 2017 AM. HEALTH L. A SSOC.
CONNECTIONS 22, 24, https://sharepoint.healthlawyers.org/find-a-resource/HealthLawHub
/Documents/Compliance/February2017_Feature3.pdf [https://perma.cc/DCN3-A7AK].
338. Id.
339. Hawk, supra note 335, at 70.
340. Id. at 69–70.
341. Lederman, supra note 262, at 1159–61.
342. Grizzle et al., supra note 337, at 24.
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their individual patients, it may become harder for those providers to justify
ordering or prescribing unnecessary tests, drugs, or DME. They may be
unable to disassociate their fraudulent actions from the patient which
would make it more difficult to convince themselves that they are
committing a victimless crime. That assumes that the change in payment
structure will impact the provider’s mindset. It is not entirely clear that is
the case. And limiting telemedicine reimbursement to A-APMs will not be a
transformative change because such a tiny percentage of providers are enrolled
in A-APMs. Further, as discussed above, fraudsters have already found ways to
evade the limitations on access to telemedicine.
Ultimately, limiting reimbursement for telemedicine to providers enrolled
in A-APMs not only puts fraud concerns before access, but it also fails to
account for the way that fraud will change based on the payment model.
Lawmakers should reject any rule that would limit telemedicine reimbursement
to providers in A-APMs. It may, however, be worth considering limiting
telemedicine reimbursement to providers in accountable care relationships.
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation has a goal of having all
traditional Medicare beneficiaries and most Medicaid beneficiaries in an
accountable care relationship with accountability for quality and cost by
2030. 343 This is a shift from the previous goal to have all Medicare
beneficiaries in APMs by 2025. In 2020, sixty-seven percent of Medicare
beneficiaries enrolled in Part A or B were in Medicare Advantage plans or in
an Accountable Care Organization through a Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Innovation model or the Shared Savings Plan. 344 This limitation
would not harm access as much as a rule that grants broad flexibility for
providers in A-APMs (which have less than fifteen percent of Medicare
beneficiaries) but does not grant similar flexibilities to providers in other plans.
C. RESTRICTIONS ON MEDICARE ENROLLMENT AND REIMBURSEMENT
It is important to examine the Medicare enrollment and reimbursement
process to determine if there are additional enrollment or reimbursement
requirements that can help prevent telemedicine scams. In recent years, CMS
has utilized the enrollment process to reduce program fraud. CMS also
utilizes its Fraud Prevention System to perform data analytics and discover
fraudulent claims.
Historically, there were few barriers to enrollment in Medicare as a
provider or supplier. That changed, however, after significant fraudulent actions
by non-existent DME providers. In 1997, OIG found that one of every fourteen
DME suppliers did not have a verifiable address and forty percent of new
343. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., BACKGROUND ON THE CMS INNOVATION CENTER
2021 STRATEGY REFRESH – PUTTING ALL PATIENTS AT THE CENTER OF CARE (2022), https://inno
vation.cms.gov/strategic-direction [https://perma.cc/D8XM-QD6C].
344. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., INNOVATION CENTER STRATEGY REFRESH 13
(2021), https://innovation.cms.gov/strategic-direction-whitepaper [https://perma.cc/8S6Q-MX93].
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applicants failed to meet supplier standards. 345 Unfortunately, “[t]he ease and
low expense of acquiring a supplier number facilitated the entry of abusers
into the Program.” 346 Beginning in 1996, CMS has required all new
providers of health care items and services to submit CMS Form 855
Provider/Supplier Enrollment Application (“CMS-855”) to enroll in the
program. 347 In 2003, CMS proposed that all providers and suppliers be
required to submit an enrollment application, obtain a Medicare billing
number, and receive Medicare billing privileges. 348
In 2006, CMS further expanded the enrollment regulations by requiring,
inter alia, that enrolled providers and suppliers resubmit and recertify the
accuracy of their enrollment information every five years. 349 In addition to the
CMS-855 enrollment requirements, DME providers must be accredited by an
independent accrediting organization as a condition of initial and continued
enrollment in Medicare. 350
The Affordable Care Act significantly increased CMS’s authority to use
the Medicare enrollment process to screen out questionable providers and
suppliers. 351 The Affordable Care Act program integrity measures include,
among other things, “mandated screening procedures, entrance fees,
mandatory compliance programs, enhanced oversight, transparency and
reporting requirements, various financial disclosure requirements, and
limitations and requirements related to ordering DME.” 352
Prior to the Affordable Care Act, provider screening was not a part of the
Medicare enrollment process. 353 CMS did not distinguish between the types
of providers and suppliers for purposes of conducting background checks. 354
When CMS conducted background checks, it reviewed criminal backgrounds,
performed site visits, examined licensure requirements, checked databases,
and looked over the Medicare Advantage Organization reports for all
enrolling providers and suppliers. 355 In 2011, CMS set forth screening levels
for Medicare providers and suppliers based on categorical risk.356 DME suppliers
345. JUNE GIBBS BROWN, U.S. DEP’ T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS: ASSURING LEGITIMACY 5–6 (1997), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/re
ports/oei-04-96-00240.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ4B-BYS2].
346. Adrienne Dresevic & Donald H. Romano, The Medicare Enrollment Process–CMS’s Most Potent
Program Integrity Tool, 23 HEALTH L. 1, 3 (2011).
347. See generally 61 Fed. Reg. 37278 (July 17, 1996) (providing the requirements).
348. Dresevic & Romano, supra note 346, at 3.
349. 42 C.F.R. § 424.515 (2022).
350. Id. § 424.57(c)(22).
351. Dresevic & Romano, supra note 346, at 11.
352. Id. at 10.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 10.
356. Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s Health Insurance Programs; Additional Screening
Requirements, Application Fees, Temporary Enrollment Moratoria, Payment Suspensions
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are in the high risk category and must undergo more background screening
than providers in limited or moderate risk categories. 357
In 2019, CMS instituted a final rule that provided program integrity
enhancements to the provider enrollment process. 358 The 2019 final rule
requires disclosure of current and prior affiliations with other health care
providers and suppliers with program integrity concerns. 359 Specifically, it
requires providers and suppliers to disclose any current affiliation
with a provider or supplier that has uncollected debt; has been or is
subject to a payment suspension under a federal health care program;
has been excluded from Medicare, Medicaid, or [Children’s Health
Insurance Programs]; or has had its Medicare, Medicaid or
[Children’s Health Insurance Programs] billing privileges denied
or revoked. 360
CMS then determines whether the disclosed affiliation “poses an undue risk
of fraud, waste, or abuse.” 361 If CMS finds an undue risk of fraud, CMS will
deny the enrollment application or revoke the Medicare enrollment of the
provider or supplier. 362

and Compliance Plans for Providers and Suppliers, 76 Fed. Reg. 5862, 5963 (Feb. 2, 2011) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1007). Under the law, Medicare providers and suppliers are divided into
limited, moderate, and high risk. 42 C.F.R. § 424.518 (2022). As the risk level increases so do
the screening requirements. If a provider is in the limited risk category, the Medicare contractor:
(1) verifies that the provider meets Federal and State requirements for that type of provider or
supplier; (2) conducts license verifications; and (3) conducts database checks pre- and postenrollment to verify compliance with the enrollment criteria. Id. § 424.518(a)(2). Independent
clinical laboratories and diagnostic testing facilities are categorized as moderate risk and require,
in addition to the limited risk screening, an on-site visit as part of the screening process. Newly
enrolled DME suppliers are in the high categorical risk category. Id. § 424.518(c)(1)(ii). In
addition to the limited and moderate screening requirements, newly enrolled DME suppliers
must provide fingerprints for all individuals with a five percent or greater direct or indirect
ownership interest. The contractor will perform a fingerprint-based criminal history check on
each individual. Id. § 424.518(c)(2).
357. 42 C.F.R. § 424.518(c).
358. Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s Health Insurance Programs; Program Integrity
Enhancements to the Provider Enrollment Process, 84 Fed. Reg. 47794, 47794–95 (Sept. 10,
2019). The final rule also expands CMS’s denial and revocation authority under 42 C.F.R.
§§ 424.530 and 424.535.56. Jessica Gustafson & Adrienne Dresevic, CMS Greatly Expands Its
Authority to Deny and Revoke Providers’ and Suppliers’ Medicare Enrollment, 32 HEALTH L. 6, 14 (2019).
359. Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s Health Insurance Programs; Program Integrity
Enhancements to the Provider Enrollment Process, 84 Fed. Reg. at 47794.
360. Id. at 47794–95. For purposes of the rule, affiliation means: (1) that an individual or
entity has a five percent or greater direct or indirect ownership interest; (2) that an individual or
entity has a general or limited partnership interest; (3) that an individual or entity exercises
control over the day-to-day operations of another entity; (4) an individual has an interest where
she is acting as an officer or director of a corporation; and (5) any reassignment relationship
under section 424.80. See 42 C.F.R. § 424.502 (2022).
361. 42 C.F.R. § 424.519(f).
362. Id. § 424.519(g).

2. COPELAND_PP_PR1_KC2 (002)_2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

TELEMEDICINE SCAMS

11/1/2022 11:37 PM

125

CMS should consider adding additional screening requirements related
to telemedicine. Currently, CMS-855 does not require any disclosures
concerning telemedicine.363 It will not be enough, however, to require disclosure
of affiliations with telemedicine companies that have program integrity
concerns because the 2019 final rule would already encompass affiliations
with those telemedicine providers. To be most effective, CMS should require
providers to disclose any affiliation with a telemedicine company regardless of
program integrity concerns. In addition, CMS may also want to consider
disclosure of a relationship with any telemedicine company that is responsible
for a certain percentage of sales for the provider—whether it be an affiliation,
as that term is defined in the regulations, or not. Although it may be
cumbersome for a provider to furnish information on every telemedicine
provider that they have done business with, this information could prove to be
critical for CMS. These disclosure requirements could assist CMS in identifying
suppliers that have inappropriate relationships with telemedicine providers.
These disclosures could also alert CMS to the need to perform additional
audits on particular providers prior to payment.
On the reimbursement end of things, DME reimbursements require the
name and provider number of the provider who ordered or prescribed
equipment. 364 To battle telemedicine fraud, CMS should consider requiring
DME suppliers, laboratories, and pharmacies to indicate whether the DME,
lab tests, or drugs were prescribed or ordered during a telemedicine visit. That
information could help Medicare Administrative Contractors identify
situations where a supplier has submitted a reimbursement claim, but there is
no matching claim for reimbursement for telemedicine services. Many of
the telemedicine scams prior to the Public Health Emergency involved
situations where suppliers submitted claims for reimbursement, but the
telemedicine providers did not submit claims. Further, CMS could also
require DME providers to supply the name of the telemedicine company.
This could assist in data analytics when seeking to identify trends.
CMS may also want to consider additional auditing requirements for
DME and laboratory tests. Specifically, it is worth considering patient verification
of telemedicine visits and/or DME or laboratory orders prior to reimbursement.
This would require a robust patient identity verification system which would
likely be very costly. This type of system may prove to be too cumbersome for
drug prescriptions due to the volume of prescriptions in Medicare. If it could
be implemented in a cost-effective way, however, it could help protect both
the patients and Medicare.
363.
364.

See supra notes 345–50 and accompanying text.
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL:
CHAPTER 5 – DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, PROSTHETICS, ORTHOTICS, AND SUPPLIES (DMEPOS)
ITEMS AND SERVICES HAVING SPECIAL DME REVIEW CONSIDERATIONS, ch. 5.2–5.7, at 3–14 (2022),
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/pim83c05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9SJ4-WMTV].
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With respect to the fraud triangle, these measures will not impact the
perceived pressure that providers face to commit fraud. Patient verification of
DME and laboratory tests may have a minor impact on rationalization. It may
be more difficult to justify this conduct if patients begin questioning the
provider about unnecessary DME and laboratory tests. Collectively, these
measures are most likely to impact the opportunity to commit fraud. If CMS
can weed out suppliers likely to commit fraud through its Medicare enrollment
process, then that reduces the opportunity to commit fraud for those who are
not entering the program in good faith. For those entering the program in
good faith, measures designed to detect fraud prior to payment will diminish
the opportunity for fraud. Providers will be aware that due to additional data,
it may be more difficult to get away with fraud. Further, verification requirements
that go directly to the patient increase the likelihood of getting caught. If
providers do not believe that they can evade the auditing and verification
process, they are less likely to engage in fraud. There is no doubt, however,
that individuals who find themselves under a great amount of perceived
pressure will find new ways to commit fraud and will attempt to falsify data to
escape detection. An ongoing commitment to assess and reassess fraud
prevention and detection will be critical as telemedicine becomes a permanent
fixture in health care.
CONCLUSION
Telemedicine has transformed our health care delivery system by expanding
access to health care without increasing the number of providers. It has
also assisted in addressing disparities in access to health care in rural and
underserved communities. During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic,
providers quickly pivoted to remote patient care. Telemedicine was critical for
providing care when people were adhering to stay-at-home orders or
quarantining. But telemedicine only emerged as a savior during COVID19 because of waivers of restrictions on reimbursement of telemedicine services.
Those waivers only last for the duration of the Public Health Emergency. Once
the Public Health Emergency is over, it is unlikely that we can impose the
same restrictions on telemedicine that existed prior to the pandemic.
Whenever a segment of the health care industry expands at an
accelerated rate there is always a danger that it will be accompanied by a
substantial uptick in fraud. Telemedicine is no different. Indeed, fraud has
followed the growth in the telemedicine industry like a shadow. Even when
telemedicine was highly restricted, fraudsters cleverly evaded Medicare’s
controls on telemedicine to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars. With
the expansion of access to telemedicine, the threat of telemedicine scams is
even greater. As we consider the future of telemedicine, we must seriously
consider fraud prevention. Lawmakers should focus on measures that
preserve access to care through telemedicine while reducing the opportunity
to commit fraud.

